2008
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.965888
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Politically Connected Boards of Directors and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts

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Cited by 220 publications
(282 citation statements)
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“…Hence, tailoring eligibility criteria to exclude most or all non-wanted bidders even though they could bid given the actual object of procurement can effectively inhibit fair competition. This is by far the most widely quoted corruption technique in the Hungarian (Báger 2011;Major Dezsériné 2003;Pálinkó, Szántó, and Tóth 2008;Papanek 2009) and international literature (Goldman, So, and Rocholl 2012;Grodeland 2005Grodeland , 2010Heggstad and Froystad 2011;Piga 2011;Soreide 2006) which was confirmed by our interviewees. Tailoring can be done by 1. defining a combination of hard criteria such as prior works or annual turnover clearly excluding some companies, or 2. setting vague and subjective criteria allowing issuers to exercise discretion in a partial manner.…”
Section: T22 Tailoring Eligibility Criteriasupporting
confidence: 78%
“…Hence, tailoring eligibility criteria to exclude most or all non-wanted bidders even though they could bid given the actual object of procurement can effectively inhibit fair competition. This is by far the most widely quoted corruption technique in the Hungarian (Báger 2011;Major Dezsériné 2003;Pálinkó, Szántó, and Tóth 2008;Papanek 2009) and international literature (Goldman, So, and Rocholl 2012;Grodeland 2005Grodeland , 2010Heggstad and Froystad 2011;Piga 2011;Soreide 2006) which was confirmed by our interviewees. Tailoring can be done by 1. defining a combination of hard criteria such as prior works or annual turnover clearly excluding some companies, or 2. setting vague and subjective criteria allowing issuers to exercise discretion in a partial manner.…”
Section: T22 Tailoring Eligibility Criteriasupporting
confidence: 78%
“…Indeed, Goldman et al (2013) show that, following the 1994 House and Senate election, the presence of former politicians affiliated to the winning (losing) political party at the boards of U.S companies increases (decreases) the total value of awarded public procurement contracts.…”
Section: The Rent-seeking Channel or "Quid-pro-quo Hypothesis": The Rmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, "allowing legislators to be employed directly by a pressure group (…) has predictable consequences for public education funding" (Couch et al 1992: 139). Second, Goldman et al (2009b) employ an event study approach to analyse the distribution of US government procurement contracts around elections where power changed from one party to another (i.e. 1994 US midterm and 2000 US presidential elections).…”
Section: Public Versus Private Interests: Empirical Evidencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet, in low-corruption countries the contractingout of public services, which has become very prevalent since the New Public Management reforms in the 1980s, may provide an opportunity to evaluate whether the decision to outsource a given service rather than keep provision 'in-house' (as well as who gets the service when outsourced) is affected by the political connections of the politicians making such decisions. One pioneering study in this respect is Goldman et al (2009b). Still, this paper looks exclusively at the national level using US data, while many such decisions are made at the local or regional government level.…”
Section: Public Versus Private Interests: Empirical Evidencementioning
confidence: 99%