Politicians’ motivation, political culture, and electoral competition

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office. We show that politicians' incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians' pay and with polarization of policy preferences. Moreover, politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave opportunistically. A political culture may therefore be selfreinforcing and multiple equilibria may arise. Lastly, we show that the mere probability that politicians care about the public interest enables opportunistic politicians to damage the reputation of their competitors. Consequently, efficient policies may be reversed. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL Classification: D72, D78.

The Perks of Being a Lawmaker: Returns to Office as a Legislative Goal

“…Carey () theorizes that rank‐and‐file members face pressures from “competing principals,” including employers, to deviate from party‐line orthodoxy on votes. Indeed, many scholars find empirical evidence that lawmakers pursue private gains while holding public office (Beniers and Dur ; Couch, Atkinson, and Shughart ; Fedele and Naticchioni 2013; Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni ; Geys and Mause ; Parker ; Szakonyi ).…”

Public Service Motivation and Politics: Behavioural Consequences Among Local Councillors in Switzerland

“…Strategic, calculated and opportunistic behaviour is a consequence of such a motivation. Politicians act in a field in which they have to struggle for power and their narrow self‐interest is to the fore (Beniers and Dur ). Politicians are motivated by being in power and their ambition is ‘influenced by political ideology, making them want to change or improve rather than serve society through public service, as PSM suggests is the case for administrators’ (Van der Wal , p. 3).…”

Paying Politicians: Not Too Little, Not Too Much

“…The assumption of uniform pay is standard in the political economy literature (e.g. Caselli and Morelli ; Messner and Polborn ; Besley ; Poutvaara and Takalo ; Beniers and Dur ; Mattozzi and Merlo ; Cerina and Deidda ) . Besides practical difficulties, one of the reasons for the absence of screening mechanisms and, especially, pay‐for‐performance schemes in politics is related to PSM.…”

“…Only a few political economy papers allow for two‐dimensional heterogeneity among agents. In Beniers and Dur (), politicians vary in competence and the extent to which they care about the public interest, while in Fedele and Naticchioni (), politicians have heterogeneous abilities and different fits with the working environment; both papers investigate the behaviour of politicians once in office but not the link between pay and selection. Caselli and Morelli () show that competent and honest individuals are attracted only when the pay is relatively high.…”