Politics−Bureaucracy Relationship in Bangladesh: Consequences for the Public Service Commission

Jahan, Ferdous; Shahan, Asif M.

doi:10.1007/s11115-008-0061-8

Cited by 14 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…The manipulation of promotion of the civil servants, and even politicization the PSC itself has been criticized and reported both in the media and the academic publications. 21 - 23 The promotion rules have been altered numerous times in favor of political manipulations. In recent past, Bangladesh Civil Service, specially the health sector, experienced the bypassing of the promotion rules.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Retaining Doctors in Rural Bangladesh: A Policy Analysis

Joarder

Rawal²,

Ahmed

et al. 2018

Int J Health Policy Manag

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Background: Retaining doctors in rural areas is a challenge in Bangladesh. In this study, we analyzed three rural retention policies: career development programs, compulsory services, and schools outside major cities – in terms of context, contents, actors, and processes. Methods: Series of group discussions between policy-makers and researchers prompted the selection of policy areas, which were analyzed using the policy triangle framework. We conducted document and literature reviews (1971-2013), key informant interviews (KIIs) with relevant policy elites (n=11), and stakeholder analysis/position-mapping. Results: In policy-1, we found, applicants with relevant expertise were not leveraged in recruitment, promotions were often late and contingent on post-graduation. Career tracks were porous and unplanned: people without necessary expertise or experience were deployed to high positions by lateral migration from unrelated career tracks or ministries, as opposed to vertical promotion. Promotions were often politically motivated. In policy-2, females were not ensured to stay with their spouse in rural areas, health bureaucrats working at district and sub-district levels relaxed their monitoring for personal gain or political pressure. Impractical rural posts were allegedly created to graft money from applicants in exchange for recruitment assurance. Compulsory service was often waived for political affiliates. In policy-3, we found an absence of clear policy documents obligating establishment of medical colleges in rural areas. These were established based on political consideration (public sector) or profit motives (private sector). Conclusion: Four cross-cutting themes were identified: lack of proper systems or policies, vested interest or corruption, undue political influence, and imbalanced power and position of some stakeholders. Based on findings, we recommend, in policy-1, applicants with relevant expertise to be recruited; recruitment should be quick, customized, and transparent; career tracks (General Health Service, Medical Teaching, Health Administration) must be clearly defined, distinct, and respected. In policy-2, facilities must be ensured prior to postings, female doctors should be prioritized to stay with the spouse, field bureaucrats should receive non-practising allowance in exchange of strict monitoring, and no political interference in compulsory service is assured. In policy-3, specific policy guidelines should be developed to establish rural medical colleges. Political commitment is a key to rural retention of doctors.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 9 , 32 Political scientists Jahan and Shahan, drawing examples from different sectors of Bangladesh, argued that the power of politics is something we cannot just ignore. 23 …”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Retaining Doctors in Rural Bangladesh: A Policy Analysis

Joarder

Rawal²,

Ahmed

et al. 2018

Int J Health Policy Manag

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“…Although two large parties—Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Bangladesh Awami League have emerged as central in politics, and the political competition between these two groups has intensified, this has not strengthened democratic rule (Osman, ). The party in power typically seeks to strengthen executive control at the expense of the legislature and the judiciary, and there is commonly capture of state institutions by the governing party to further its own political goals (Jahan & Shahan, ). The phenomenon of state‐capture developed a ‘winner‐take‐all’ system and the maintenance of patron–client relationships that allow the illicit channeling of public resources to specific client groups (IGS, ; IGS, ).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Economy and Quality of Primary Health Service in Rural Bangladesh and the United States of America: A Comparative Analysis

Osman

Bennett

2018

J of Intl Development

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We examined the quality of publicly provided primary healthcare service in two different rural settings: USA and Bangladesh. Using both primary and secondary data, the quality of primary healthcare services was examined across four dimensions: access, equity, responsiveness and citizen's influence over services. Findings demonstrate that apart from responsiveness, the US underperforms across all other dimensions of quality. Compared with the US, Bangladesh fared worse in almost all indicators other than physically accessibility. Wider political economy factors that shaped the quality of service were the colonial legacy, political competition, the economic system and social inequality. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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“…The Bangladesh Public Service Commission is the main recruitment body of the BCS (see Q. Alam & Teicher, , p. 869). The civil servants can be classified into two categories of cadre: generalist administrators and specialists/professionals (Jahan & Shahan, ; Suk Kim & Monem, ; Zafarullah, ). Generalist administrators dominate the BCS, and they are represented in the great majority of ministries.…”

Section: Characteristics Of the State Bureaucracy In Bangladeshmentioning

confidence: 99%

State Bureaucracy and the Management of Climate Change Adaptation in Bangladesh

Rahman¹,

Tosun

2018

Review of Policy Research

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Bangladesh is widely regarded as a country that is heavily affected by the threats of climate change. In this study, we analyze the management of projects aiming to adapt to climate change in the period from 2009 to 2015. We are interested in two aspects: first, the overall bureaucratic setup of the adaptation regime, and second, the appointment of directors to the individual programs and what role foreign funding plays in making appointment decisions. With regard to the latter, it should be noted that project directors are an important arm of state bureaucracy in Bangladesh who guide the whole implementation and management of a development project, including its financial, regulatory, and informational dimensions. More specifically, we ask whether generalists or professionals are appointed as directors of the relevant projects. We argue and then show that the chances of appointing a professional as the director increase with the volume of foreign funding.Bangladesh es visto como un pa ıs que est a fuertemente afectado por amenazas del cambio clim atico, y por ende los creadores de pol ıticas dom esticas y las agencias de ayuda bilaterales y multilaterales han empezado muchos proyectos que buscan la adaptaci on a desaf ıos presentes y futuros para la poblaci on y la infraestructura. En este estudio analizamos la gesti on de proyectos que buscan la adaptaci on al cambio clim atico en el periodo de 2009 a 2015. Estamos interesados en dos aspectos: primero, el arreglo burocr atico general de adaptaci on al r egimen, y segundo, el nombramiento de directores para los programas individuales y el papel que juega el financiamiento desde el extranjero para las decisiones de nombramientos. En lo que concierne a esto ultimo, deber ıa mencionarse que los directores del proyecto son una secci on importante de la burocracia de estado en Bangladesh que gu ıan la totalidad de la implementaci on y la gesti on de un proyecto de desarrollo, incluyendo sus dimensiones financieras, Review of Policy Research, Volume 35, Number 6 (2018) 10.1111/ropr.12289 V C 2018 Policy Studies Organization. All rights reserved. bs_bs_banner 835regulatorias e informacionales. M as espec ıficamente, preguntamos si generalistas o profesionales son nombrados directores de proyectos relevantes. Argumentamos y despu es demostramos que las oportunidades para nombrar a profesionales como directores incrementan con el volumen del financiamiento extranjero. Este hallazgo contribuye a la literatura existente de la administraci on p ublica en general, y a la literatura acerca de la adaptaci on al cambio clim atico en pa ıses de bajos recursos en particular.

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Politics−Bureaucracy Relationship in Bangladesh: Consequences for the Public Service Commission

Abstract: Public Service Commission, Bangladesh Civil Service, Politicization of bureaucracy, Recruitment, Corruption, Institutions of accountability, Ministry of Establishment, Public administration in Bangladesh,

Cited by 14 publications

References 16 publications

Retaining Doctors in Rural Bangladesh: A Policy Analysis

Retaining Doctors in Rural Bangladesh: A Policy Analysis

Political Economy and Quality of Primary Health Service in Rural Bangladesh and the United States of America: A Comparative Analysis

State Bureaucracy and the Management of Climate Change Adaptation in Bangladesh

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