Politics, Evidence and the New Aid Agenda

Abstract

Based on study of (a) the HIPC debt relief initiative, (b) the linking of aid to policy conditionality and (c) transactions-cost arguments in favour of programme aid, this article argues that major elements in the new aid agenda may not be well-based empirically. This is partly because of inadequate knowledge, but particularly because the evidence often conflicts with political preferences. As a result, it is likely that large amounts of aid resources are being misdirected. Ways are suggested of narrowing the gap between evidence-based and 'political' decisionmaking. In the meantime, donors should avoid diverting more aid into debt relief, should roll back their reliance on policy conditionality, and should exercise pragmatic caution in the expansion of programme assistance.

Mewujudkan REDD+: strategi nasional dan berbagai pilihan kebijakan

“…Dukungan anggaran berpotensi untuk menurunkan biaya transaksi, meningkatkan koordinasi lintas sektor dan merealisasikan manfaat tambahan, membangkitkan rasa kepemilikan negara yang lebih besar, dan menjamin kesatuan kebijakan secara umum (Killick 2004). Berbagai potensi kelebihan ini sama dengan kelebihan yang ada dalam pengelolaan dana di dalam administrasi nasional.…”

Realising REDD+: national strategy and policy options

“…Budget support has the potential to reduce transaction costs, improve coordination across sectors and delivery of co-benefits, generate greater country ownership and assure overall policy coherence (Killick 2004). These potential advantages are similar to those generated by a fund within the national administration.…”

Political‐Economy Analysis, Aid Effectiveness and the Art of Development Management

“…But such an assessment is severely complicated by the difficulty of measuring both concepts, and by their variation within agencies and over time, not least because of their mutual interdependence (Waterman and Meier, 1998). This article explores an alternative perspective on aid effectiveness as both a highly complex problem and one that is deeply and unavoidably political (see, for example, Killick, 2004;Hyden, 2008;Haymen, 2009;Booth, 2011). It does so by exploring how, and how well, donor activities are informed by effective political-economy analysis (PEA).…”