Politics, Insurance Regulation, and Unfunded Pension Liabilities

Abstract

Insurance regulators operate in an environment in which resources are scarce and issues are most often complex and not salient to affected persons. Consequently, regulatory agencies, such as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), need to use resources efficiently by making issues salient and not complex if regulatory goals are to be attained. To further its goal of full funding of defined benefit pension plans, the PBGC annually published a list of the Top Fifty Companies With the Largest Underfunded Pension Liability (LIST). This article investigates the issue of the economic effects of pension plan disclosure by measuring the share price response of the companies included on the LIST; then policy implications are drawn. The event study findings show that, on average, publication of the LIST did not have a negative effect on firm value. However, cross-sectional analysis provides some support for the contention that publication of the LIST had an economic cost on LISTed firms. The authors' results show that the value of large firms on the PBGC's list is less negatively affected at arrival (ARRIVAL) than smaller LISTed firms. Conversely, when firms leave the list (DEPARTURE), the value of large growth-oriented firms is more negatively affected than the value of other firms that reduce their unfunded pension liability. From a policy perspective, as hypothesized by Meier (1991), the PBGC used its scarce resources effectively by publishing the LIST. The issue of unfunded pension liability became less complex and more salient to interested parties. Consequently, consumer groups and political elites provided their support to further the regulatory agency's stated goal, which was the full funding of defined benefit pension plans. Furthermore, increased awareness of the underfunding problem contributed to the passage of the Retirement Protection Act of 1994.

Comparing Costs and Risks of Retirement Plans for Sponsors

“…Francis and Reiter () find that tax, accounting, labor relations, and capital structure conditions have varied and complex influences on the funding strategies of plan sponsors. Power et al () find that regulatory actions by the PBGC via publication of a list of severely underfunded plans have some economic and political impact to encourage better funding outcomes. McKillop and Pogue () examine the relationship between funding risk of DB plans and corporate debt ratings and equity risk of large U.K. plans.…”