Politics, leadership, and experience in designing Ontario's cabinet

Abstract

Why are cabinet decision‐making systems designed the way they are? Traditional approaches to this question stress the importance of representational imperatives (i.e., region, language and gender), the need for managerial capacity and collegiality in complex organizations, or a particular government's fiscal or policy program. While these approaches have merit, they fail to pay sufficient attention to the fact that cabinet decision‐making systems are in the first instance very intimate reflections and extensions of the political instincts, personal aptitudes, and governing experience of first ministers. The author sets out to understand recent reforms to Ontario cabinet decision‐making in precisely this way ‐ how did Premier Michael Harris' sense of his government's mandate, his personal approach to decision‐making, and the practical lessons learned over the course of his government's first mandate influence the design of Ontario's cabinet decision‐making system between 1995 and 1999? This article begins with a short history of Ontario's cabinet decision‐making system, focusing on the period from 1968 to 1995. It then provides details of reforms introduced between 1995 and 1999 and concludes with some thoughts on how Premier Harris' political instincts, personal aptitudes, and governing experience influenced these reforms. Sommaire: Pourquoi les systèmes de prise de décisions du Cabinet sont‐ils conçus comme ils le sont? Les réponses traditionnelles à cette question soulignent l'impor‐tance des impératifs de représentation (c.‐à‐d. la région, la langue et le sexe), le besoin de compétence en matière de gestion et la collégialité dans les organismes complexes, ou bien un programme politique ou budgétaire particulier du gouvernement. Ces approches sont valables, mais elles ne tiennent pas suffisamment compte du fait que les systemes de prise de décisions du Cabinet sont, avant tout, le fruit de reflexions très approfondies et d'instincts politiques, d'aptitudes personnelles, et de l'expérience gouvernementale des premiers ministres. L'auteur de cet article essaie de comprendre, précisément dans ce sens, les récentes réformes en matière de prise de décisions au Cabinet de 1'Ontario: comment est‐ce que l'idée qu'a Michael Harris du mandat de son gouvernement, son approche personnelle face à la prise de décisions, et les leçons pratiques tirées de son premier mandat (1995–1999) ont‐elles influencé la conception du système de prise de décisions du Cabinet de l'Ontario? L'auteur commence par brosser un bref historique du système de prise de décisions du Cabinet de l'Ontario, en se penchant tout particulièrement sur la période allant de 1968 A 1995. Ensuite, il présente en détail les réformes introduites de 1995 à 1999 et conclut par quelques réflexions sur la manière dont les instincts politiques du Premier ministre Harris, ses aptitudes personnelles et son expérience du gouvernement ont influencé ces réformes.

The management and administration of government communications in Canada

“…The communications function in Canadian government is a “rare area that is found organizationally in both the public service and political spheres, [reflecting] its position on the cusp between politics and administration, nurturing both but belonging fully to neither” (Brown ). In the Westminster‐based federal and Ontario governments, both political and permanent executives share responsibility for managing communications activities (Brown ; Glenn , ; Kiss ; Thomas , ). Members of the political executive (that is, first ministers and their cabinet ministers) in these two jurisdictions are broadly considered “principal spokespersons” (TBS ) for their governments, with responsibility for their government's overall communication priorities, objectives and requirements, which involves working with nonpartisan public servants.…”

“…The Government of Ontario's communications machinery was instituted in the late 1990s. Similar to the Trudeau reforms, Premier Mike Harris and his advisors sought to enhance the capacity of central agencies (especially the Premier's Office and Cabinet Office) to “provide strategic communications direction” across the entire government (Glenn ). Like the PMO, the Premier's Office was given responsibility for providing political advice to the Premier and cabinet on all major communications plans and activities, including the day‐to‐day issues management process.…”

“…On the nonpartisan side, “a new deputy minister of communications position [was created] within Cabinet Office (together with three new assistant deputy ministers) and each ministry's communications resources [were reorganized] into single communications branches” (Glenn ). Cabinet Office Communications was responsible for helping to establish the government's communications priorities, key policies and programs, communicating them to ministries, and guiding and supporting communications plans and products at the ministry level.…”

“…Most research focuses on federal government communications management and administration (Thomas , ; Brown ) and federal advertising in particular (Rose , and ; Rose and Roberts ; Rose and Mellon ). There is useful but limited insight into communications management and administration in Alberta (Kiss ), Ontario (Glenn , ) and Canadian municipal government in general (Killingsworth ). Canadian public administration textbooks do not cover communications (see Barker ; Dunn ; Inwood ; Johnson ; Leone and Ohemeng ; Malcomson and Myers ) nor have leading journals like Canadian Journal of Political Science , Canadian Public Administration or Canadian Public Policy published on the topic at least since 2000.…”

Reading Ontario politics and public administration

“…As Ted Glenn has demonstrated with respect to the construction of Mike Harris's cabinet, decision-making processes and structures including a transition from one government to another "are in the first instance very intimate reflections and extensions of the political instincts, personal aptitudes, and governing experience of first ministers." 16 Cameron and White would agree, and they identify politicians, along with their mandates and the bureaucracy, as a transition's building blocks. This means, however, that no amount of bureaucratic planning can predictably temper or direct such immeasurables as the premier-designate's personality and predilections.…”