Politics of Nationhood and the Displacement of the Founding Moment: Contending Histories of the Turkish Nation

Çınar, Alev; Taş, Hakkı

doi:10.1017/s0010417517000202

Cited by 14 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 28 publications

(32 reference statements)

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“…Colovic (2002) and Zubrzycki (2006Zubrzycki ( , 2011 have identified the power of symbolic actions and mythologies in the resurgence of Serbian and Polish nationalism as well as in legitimizing radical political changes in these countries far before us. A similar fundamental political transformation has been legitimized more recently in Turkey by reinterpreting the founding moments of the Turkish nation and reshaping the public understanding of its history (Çinar and Has 2017). Similarly Chris Hann (2015) has proven (using the example of Ópusztaszer) how politicians manipulate the national past in Hungary to authenticate the political representation of a national grandeur.…”

Section: Memory Politics and Neonationalismmentioning

confidence: 93%

Memory-Politics and Neonationalism: Trianon as Mythomoteur

Feischmidt

2020

Nationalities Papers

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Analyzing the newly emerged Trianon cult, this article argues that the current wave of memory politics became the engine of new forms of nationalism in Hungary constituted by extremist and moderate right-wing civic and political actors. Following social anthropologists Gingrich and Banks, the term neonationalism will be applied and linked with the concept “mythomoteur” of John Armstrong and Anthony D. Smith, emphasizing the role of preexisting ethno-symbolic resources or mythomoteurs in the resurgence of nationalism. Special attention will be given to elites who play a major role in constructing new discourses of the nation and seek to control collective memories, taking their diverse intentions, agendas, and strategies specifically into consideration. This “view from above” will be complemented with a “view from below” by investigating the meanings that audiences give to and the uses they make of these memories. Thus, the analysis has three dimensions: it starts with the analysis of symbols, topics, and arguments applied by public Trianon discourses; it continues with the analysis of everyday perceptions, memory, and identity concerns; and finally ends with an anthropological interpretation of memory politics regarding a new form of nationalism arising in the context of propelling and mainstreaming populist right-wing politics. The main argument of this article is that although the Hungarian Trianon cult, identified as national mythomoteur, invokes a historical trauma, it rather speaks to current feelings of loss and disenfranchisement, offering symbolic compensation through the transference of historical glory, pride, and self-esteem within a mythological framework. This article is part of a larger effort to understand the cultural logic and social support of new forms of nationalism in Hungary propelled by the populist far right.

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Section: Memory Politics and Neonationalismmentioning

confidence: 93%

Memory-Politics and Neonationalism: Trianon as Mythomoteur

Feischmidt

2020

Nationalities Papers

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“…Just like in Israel, a number of taboo subjects in Turkish political discourse, such as the Armenian genocide, discriminatory policies towards non-Muslim minorities, and Kurdish minority rights, began to be openly discussed. In this period, the ontological dissonance created by the unsettling of established identity narratives was widespread among the secular opposition to the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi [Justice and Development Party] government, visibly manifest in the massive 'Republic Rallies' held in major Turkish cities in 2007 (Cinar and Tas 2017). But it could have only limited political effect as long as the alternative self-narrative of a European Turkey allayed the anxieties associated with departing from entrenched hardliner positions on a variety of so-called national issues.…”

Section: Recognition and Identity Backlash In Turkeymentioning

confidence: 99%

Agonistic recognition as a remedy for identity backlash: insights from Israel and Turkey

Strömbom

Rumelili

2021

Third World Quarterly

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While an extensive part of the conflict transformation literature stresses the importance of transforming the identities of conflict parties through recognition, it fails to recognise the propensity of such transformations to generate ontological insecurity and dissonance, and consequently a possible backlash towards antagonistic identities. Drawing on agonistic thought, we develop a conception of agonistic recognition, premised on non-finalism, pluralist multilogue and disaggregated recognition. We suggest that these elements of agonistic recognition may guard against the development of ontological insecurity and dissonance in recognition processes. We comparatively analyse the connections and tensions between recognition, ontological insecurity/ dissonance and identity backlash experienced during the transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the context of the Oslo Peace Process in the 1990s and Turkey's 'rapprochement' with Greece in the context of its EU accession process in the 2000s. We also assess the presence of the elements of agonistic recognition in these two conflict transformation processes. Our contribution constitutes an important step towards the specification of agonistic peace in terms of its underlying recognition processes and in developing the empirical study of agonistic elements in actual conflict transformation processes.

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“…Instead, a bold disregard for truth, discrediting sources of evidence-based knowledge and an avalanche of emotion-and crisis-driven content informed AKP's post-Gezi narrative and of 15 July in particular. In this endeavor, the party could be compared to its strange bedfellow: the contemporary anti-Western variant of Kemalist nationalism, called Ulusalcilik (Çınar and Taş 2017).…”

Section: Turkey's Post-truth Coupmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Various, even rival, political actors from the right to left have prescribed themselves as Kemalist. For a recent discussion of multiple Kemalisms and the Ulusalcı variant, in particular, see Çınar and Taş (2017). 7.…”

Section: Turkey's Post-truth Coupmentioning

confidence: 99%