Polity IV, 1800-1999

Marshall, Monty G.; Gurr, Ted Robert; Davenport, Christian; Jaggers, Keith

doi:10.1177/001041400203500103

Cited by 1,087 publications

(1,289 citation statements)

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“…As possible determinants of programs, loans, and compliance, the initial regressions included a huge number of variables that have been suggested in the literature: the rate of monetary expansion, the overall budget deficit, general government consumption relative to GDP, real GDP growth, GDP per capita, the share of foreign short-term debt in total foreign debt, the total level of outstanding debt, total debt service (in percent of GDP), the rate of inflation, a country's international reserves (in months of imports), the current account balance as a percent of GDP, openness to trade (all World Bank data) and the LIBOR on three months credits to US banks (IMF 2003). I include the following political and social variables: the degree of democracy (Marshall and Jaggers 2000), a measure of political instability (Dreher 2002), 23 fractionalization of the legislature, proportional representation, a dummy for special interest governments, government ideological cohesion and the duration of the political regime (all from Beck et al 2001). All regressions also include a dummy for each individual country; where necessary an AR(1) term is included to correct for serial correlation.…”

Section: Methods and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality

2006

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractIn theory, the IMF could influence economic growth via several channels, among them advice to policy makers, money disbursed under its programs, and its conditionality. This paper tries to disentangle those effects empirically. Using panel data for 98 countries over the period 1970-2000 it analyzes whether IMF involvement influences economic growth in program countries. Consistent with the results of previous studies, it is shown that IMF programs reduce growth rates when their endogeneity is accounted for. There is only weak evidence that compliance with conditionality mitigates this negative effect. IMF loans have no statistically significant impact.

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Section: Methods and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality

2006

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“…Our main measure of democracy is the combined polity score from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2008), rescaled between 0 (full autocracy) and 1 (full democracy). This widely-used index consists of underlying components capturing key characteristics of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and the degree of political competition.…”

Section: Democracymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Democratic Transition

Murtin¹,

Wacziarg²

2011

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Over the last two centuries, many countries experienced regime transitions toward democracy. We document this democratic transition over a long time horizon. We use historical time series of income, education and democracy levels from 1870 to 2000 to explore the economic factors associated with rising levels of democracy. We find that primary schooling, and to a weaker extent per capita income levels, are strong determinants of the quality of political institutions. We find little evidence of causality running the other way, from democracy to income or education.

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“…Secondly, we consider political freedom only and we build the non-politically free donor pool with those countries that between 1995 and 2010 show a Polity IV [Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2012] DEMOC value equal to 0 in all the periods. Finally, we consider the 1989 shock as the trigger for a multi-dimensional transition, we include in the most stringent non-free donor pool those countries that are both non-economically and non-politically free.…”

Section: Methodology and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Synthetic ‘real socialism’: a counterfactual analysis of political and economic liberalizations

Petrarca

Ricciuti

2015

Economics and Business Review EBR

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ARTICLES Why did the knowledge transition occur in the West and not in the East Economics and Business ReviewEconomics and Business Review, Vol. 1 (15), No. 1, 2015: 69-88 DOI 10.18559/ebr.2015 Synthetic 'real socialism': a counterfactual analysis of political and economic liberalizations 1 Ilaria Petrarca, 2 Roberto Ricciuti 2 Abstract : We evaluate the effect of the 1989 shock over economic development in four Eastern European countries. We apply a counterfactual approach and define the shock alternatively as the trigger for economic openness, political competition, or both. The main result is an effect of economic freedom larger than the one of democratization. In Poland and Bulgaria we find a positive impact of economic freedom, whilst in Bulgaria there is also a smaller effect of democratization. In Albania, after an initial recession, economic freedom helps recovery. Finally Romania does not show any robust effect.

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Polity IV, 1800-1999

Cited by 1,087 publications

References 4 publications

IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality

IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality

The Democratic Transition

Synthetic ‘real socialism’: a counterfactual analysis of political and economic liberalizations

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