Pollution Permits, Imperfect Competition and Abatement Technologies

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractUnder imperfect competition, the eect of a cap-and-trade system on industry prots depends on the type of abatement technology that is used by rms: industries that use process-integrated technologies are more aected than those using end-of-pipe abatement technologies. The interaction between environmental policy and the evolution of the market structure is then studied. In particular, a reserve of pollution permits for new entrants is justied when the industry uses a process-integrated abatement technology, while a system with a preemption right may be justied in the case of end-of-pipe abatement technology.JEL Classication: L13, Q53, Q58.

Waste emission reduction decision-making for industrial symbiosis chains in a competitive market considering environmental regulations

“…Let P i denote the pollution produced by the manufacturer i before any investment in abatement. Our paper assumes that P i = eq i (e > 0 ) is the emission rate [36,11,23]. A linear relationship between P i and q i is a reasonable approximation in many industrial sectors-for example when pollution and production are linearly correlated with fuel consumption.…”

“…∂L c ∂x j = −2c j q 2 j x j + η c j + εq j − ϑ c j = 0 (11) with the complementary slackness conditions η c i x i = 0, ϑ c i (x i − 1) = 0, η c j x j = 0, ϑ c j (x j − 1) = 0; and the feasibility constraints…”

End-of-pipe or cleaner production? How to go green in presence of income inequality and pro-environmental behavior

“…11 We nest in our setting the choice between end-of-pipe and cleaner technologies, as we want to investigate whether these relative preferences affect the profitability of one technology versus the other. Contributions on this choice are mainly devoted to analyzing the impact of environmental regulation on the decision of the producer regarding which green technology to adopt (Calel, 2011;Christin et al, 2013;Frondel et al, 2007;Johnstone et al, 2010;Nicolaï and Meunier, 2014). 12 There is common agreement on two main findings.…”

Higher Costs for Higher Profits: A General Assessment and an Application to Environmental Regulations

“…They assume that firms are asymmetric with respect to both marginal costs and pollution intensity; however, they do not consider the effect of implementing pollution permits on firms' profits when individual firms can modify their emission intensity or use abatement technologies. Christin et al (2013) [8] analyze the design of emission permits and show that the effect of a permit price increase on firms' profits depends on the type of abatement technologies that are available. They consider initially constant marginal costs of production and compare two specific abatement technologies (end-of-pipe and process integrated).…”