Polysemy and co-predication

Abstract

Many word forms in natural language are polysemous, but only some of them allow for co-predication, that is, they allow for simultaneous predications selecting for two different meanings or senses of a nominal in a sentence. In this paper, we try to explain (i) why some groups of senses allow co-predication and others do not, and (ii) how we interpret co-predicative sentences. The paper focuses on those groups of senses that allow co-predication in an especially robust and stable way. We argue, using these cases, but focusing particularly on the multiply polysemous word school, that the senses involved in co-predication form especially robust activation packages, which allow hearers and readers to access all the different senses in interpretation.

Chomskyan Arguments Against Truth-Conditional Semantics Based on Variability and Co-predication

“…A literalist hypothesis would predict that a particular sense of each word is accessed easier in all conditions. However, by and large, this is not what is observed, especially in the case of polysemies that pass copredication tests (Frisson, 2015, Schumacher, 2013, Ortega-Andrés & Vicente, 2019).…”

“…The approach, however, shares some problems with the pragmatic approach, since there is evidence against any kind of general literalist approach. In many cases (and especially in the cases of copredication), switching from one sense to another of a polysemous expression is smooth, there being no trace of an operation such as coercion (Frisson, 2015, Schumacher, 2013, Ortega-Andrés & Vicente, 2019.…”

Copredication, polysemy and context-sensitivity

“…A second view that could be impacted is the polysemy account of copredication due to Ortega-Andrés and Vicente (2019). This account appeals to several senses of 'book' in order to explain why (1) (repeated below) can be felicitous and true:…”

Polysemy and thought: Toward a generative theory of concepts

“…This sort of flexibility is characteristic of polysemy and is impermissible for homonyms. There are counterexamples—for instance, the meat‐versus‐animal senses of “lamb” do not admit of anaphoric binding or the related phenomenon of copredication (Ortega Andrés & Vicente, 2019). As I will argue below, the best evidence for the polysemy/homonymy distinction is experimental.…”

“…The debate between denotational semanticists like Fodor and Lepore and nondenotational semanticists like Pustejovsky often rested on intuitions. Is the same meaning of “lamb” involved in “X hugged a lamb” and “X ate some lamb?” Some intuitions may be more robust, such as copredication and anaphoric‐binding tests for polysemy (Ortega Andrés & Vicente, 2019). But such tests fail for some polysemes (e.g., “lamb”).…”