by making additional predetermined ISO payments for Abstract-This paper studies the economic equilibrium power transmission capacity based on their induced incremental pool with aggregated demand, Cournot generators and an network flows. Another approach minimizes the total per unit independent system operator with no secondary market for power cost given an inelastic demand and flow constraints transmission capacity. The independent system operator [13]. In this strategy, a flow-based transmission charge is manages congestion by attempting to deliver maximum quantity added to the supplier bids when the system becomes at least cost. The paper formulates a non-cooperative game . between suppliers as a maximum total quantity problem subject congesteand to network flow constraints and supplier first order profit congestion.maximizing conditions. The paper shows that unconstrainted Fixed zonal pricing and transmission line-loading relief solutions to the proposed formulation are Nash equilibriums and (TLR) are non-market based congestion management policies supplier profits are mutually maximized. Numerical examples [3]. Fixed zonal pricing divides the grid into price zones demonstrate a supplier selection policy that is based on their connected by lines likely to congest. TLR deals with grid contributions to network flows. This policy will drive the network to the maximum quantity solution without further emergenc ies a i e eonmi onsiderash[3]. intervention.~~~~~~~~This paper applies the results of the Nash-Coumnot intervention. Index Terms-Game theory, Mathematical programming, oligopoly game [4], [7]-[8], [14] to describe an ISO/Pool with Power system economics, Congestion management. Coumot suppliers and an aggregated demand in which no transmission capacity market is available and congestion I. INTRODUCTION management is achieved through a regulated policy for transmission access [3]. We assume that the transmission A N economically and operationally efficient method of P a t i congestion is key to the access policy is developed with the aim to achieve the developmanagin trolesansmision markets I 13 Effective maximum total supplied quantity in the system given the development of wholesale power markets[1]-[13] Effective network flow constraints [12]. The paper defines acongestion management protects against market mathematical program whose objective is to maximize the manipulation, uses network resources efficiently and total supplied quantity subject to a set of convex flow promotes the lowest generation cost. Efficient network constraints and the first order supplier profit maximizing management economically assigns costs and benefits conditions. The paper proves that the above program has a proportionally to suppliers according to their impact on feasible solution that is a Nash equilibrium [14]. This network operations. An Independent System Operator (ISO) provides an equivalent formulation of the Nash-Coumot typically handles these functions in power pool operation [1]. oligopoly that could be useful in pr...