Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia

Abstract

With weak law-enforcement institutions, a positive shock to the value of natural resources may increase demand for private protection and opportunities for rent appropriation through extortion, favoring the emergence of mafia-type organizations. We test this hypothesis by investigating the emergence of the mafia in XIX century Sicily, where a severe lack of state property-right enforcement coincided with a steep rise in international demand for sulfur, Sicily's most valuable export commodity. Using historical data on the early incidence of mafia activity and on the distribution of sulfur reserves, we document that the mafia was more present in municipalities with greater sulfur availability.

The Causes and Consequences of Organised Crime: Preliminary Evidence Across Countries

“…Buonanno et al (2015) test the hypothesis, first proposed by Gambetta (1996), that the rise of the Sicilian mafia at the end of the nineteenth century was a response to demand for private protection by landlords in a context of resource boom and weak law enforcement by the newborn Italian state. The first article digs deeper into the relationship between natural resource abundance, state fragility and the emergence of organised crime.…”

The Storm Before the Calm? Adverse Effects of Tackling Organized Crime

“…Those considering its origins view a criminal organization as a pseudo‐state (for example Skaperdas and Syropoulos, ; Anderson and Bandiera, ; Dixit, ). In the presence of weak law enforcement, organized criminal groups set up to supply private protection (often sparked by an increase in the value of assets needing protection, see Buonanno et al ., ). This literature emphasizes the localized nature of a lot of organized crime.…”

The Roots of a Dual Equilibrium: GDP, Productivity and Structural Change in the Italian Regions in the Long-Run (1871-2011)

“…Provincial figures would remarkably increase the robustness of conditional convergence tests, at least for specific periods, thus giving us better insights on the roles played by human and social capital (for both variables too, figures can be produced at the provincial level), as well as by natural endowments. At the provincial level, and at least for specific periods, even estimates of institutional functioning and differences, to be profitably tested into models, could be produced: for instance, for what concerns agrarian regimes (hard to be generalized at the regional level), or the historical presence of organized crime in specific territories of the South (Buonanno et al, 2015), or election corruption and cronyism. The overall picture -the broad pattern of territorial inequality in the long run -would not change; it may instead significantly improve the interpretation.…”