Population Planning after the One-Child Policy: Shifting Modes of Political Steering in China

Abstract

Since late 2013, one of China's most controversial policies -the one-child policy -has been gradually phased out, culminating in the reorganization of the National Health and Family Planning Commission in early 2018, which saw it drop the family planning part from its name. Has China forgone population intervention and started to pursue a liberal population policy? This article demonstrates that the Chinese political leadership is still determined to steer the direction of future demographic developments, even though it changed course and has to employ new modes of steering. In fact, it has even elevated political steering of demographic developments to new heights under the rubric of 'top-level design' (dingceng sheji). This study takes a comparative look at the two ends of the life course, birth and old age, to reveal the continuity and change in population planning and policy discourses in China.In late 2013, China's newly installed government under Xi Jinping first decided to relax and then two years later to abolish its decades-old 'one-child policy' (OCP). The news was received with a sense of relief in the Western press. Many reports recounted the numerous problematic aspects of the OCP, such as forced abortions and sterilizations, a skewed sex ratio, the rapid aging of society and shrinking labor supply. The reports also often highlighted that the policy might have been unnecessary in the first place, because the social changes accompanying economic development -urbanization, rising educational standards, more self-determination for women, etc. -would have depressed the birth rate by default without employing the draconian measures associated with the OCP. 1 Now demographers argue that Chinese couples would be reluctant to take up the opportunity to have a 1 Martin K. Whyte, Feng Wang and Yong Cai, 'Challenging myths about China's one-child policy', China Journal 74 (2015), pp. 144-159; Zhongwei Zhao and Guangyu Zhang, 'Socioeconomic factors have been the major driving force of China's fertility changes since the mid-1990s', Demography (2018).

High-Modernist Urban Planning in Beijing for Population Control

“…As mentioned above, the state ultimately holds the planning power in the two-part process and uses top-level design to ensure compliance (for another example of population planning under top-level design, compare Alpermann and Zhan, 2019). That is to say, the detailed plans are directly derived from the master plan and follow a strict hierarchical order.…”

Hybridization in China's elder care service provision

“…After the “Law of the People's Republic of China on Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly” was adopted in 1996 (China.org, 2007), the party‐state has sought to develop a three‐level care infrastructure, providing residential, community‐based and home‐based care. It has attempted to achieve this goal by devolving care responsibilities to the local government and by fostering the “socialization” of elder care via marketization and incentivizing social organizations to take over care provision (Alpermann and Zhan, 2018). One key strategy to foster this “socialization” has been to promote the establishment of “public‐private partnerships” by providing various kinds of subsidies.…”

“…One key strategy to foster this “socialization” has been to promote the establishment of “public‐private partnerships” by providing various kinds of subsidies. As Alpermann and Zhan (2018) note, “private investments are encouraged in any form, be it as separate entities or in cooperation with public providers, as joint ventures, stockholders, partners or by leasing public institutions and running them privately” (2019: 360). Since the 12th Five‐Year Plan (FYP) (2011–2015) the party‐state has further sped up its efforts, seeking to implement a “90–7‐3 framework” in which 90% of Chinese elderly are to be supported via home‐based care, 7 % of the elderly are to receive supplementary community‐based care and for 3 % care is to be provided in residential care facilities (Strauss & Xu, 2018).…”

Permits, Points, and Permanent Household Registration: Recalibrating Hukou Policy under “Top-Level Design”

“…Alongside the popularisation of “top-level design,” scholars have begun to reassess these theories on China’s policy process. Cross-system coordination in policymaking and vigorous top-down enforcement are identified as prominent characteristics of the new “mode of rule” under Xi Jinping (Ahlers, 2018; Alpermann and Zhang, 2018; Stepan and Ahlers, 2016). Recently, Schubert and Alpermann (2019) have further advanced a new theoretical framework of political steering to elucidate the continuity and change of China’s policy process before and since Xi’s accession to power.…”