Populism and the Construction of Political Charisma

Gurov, Boris Milouchev; Zankina, Emilia

doi:10.2753/ppc1075-8216600101

Cited by 28 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…To identify populist candidates in our data set, we assessed whether or not they were referred to as such in relevant published research. We relied on the few existing comparative works (Mudde ; Norris and Inglehart ), systematic collections of case studies (Albertazzi and McDonnell ; Aalberg et al ), and additional single‐case studies for selected countries (e.g., Gurov and Zankina ; Bos and Brants ; Džankić and Keil ), all based on similar thin definitions of populism as an ideology that advocates for people centrism and anti‐elitism (Mudde ) or more generally an opposition between the common people and the (corrupt, wicked) elites. To be sure, more complex definitions of populism exist (most notably a thick definition that also includes exclusion of particular groups or nations; Jagers and Walgrave ; Aalberg et al ); however, the thin approach based on people centrism and anti‐elitism can be seen as a minimal set of requirements for being classified as a populist.…”

Section: Measuring the Personality Reputation Of Candidates: Data Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

Donald Trump, Populism, and the Age of Extremes: Comparing the Personality Traits and Campaigning Styles of Trump and Other Leaders Worldwide

Nai¹,

Coma²,

Maier³

2019

Pres Stud Q

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A common narrative portrays Donald Trump as impetuous and quick to anger, thin skinned, constantly lying, brazen, vulgar, and boasting a grandiose sense of self and his accomplishments. Little systematic evidence exists that this is the case, however. With a novel data set based on expert ratings, we (1) provide systematic empirical evidence about Trump’s personality profile, (2) contrast his profile with 21 other populist leaders and 82 mainstream candidates having competed in recent elections worldwide, and (3) discuss the implications of such an extreme profile in terms of campaigning style and the use of negative and emotional campaigns. Our results illustrate Trump’s off‐the‐charts personality and campaigning style and suggest that even when compared with other abrasive, narcissistic, and confrontational political figures, he stands out as an outlier among the outliers. We conclude by discussing the implications and potential outcomes of such an extreme personality profile for Trump’s policy style and achievements while in office.

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Section: Measuring the Personality Reputation Of Candidates: Data Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

Donald Trump, Populism, and the Age of Extremes: Comparing the Personality Traits and Campaigning Styles of Trump and Other Leaders Worldwide

Nai¹,

Coma²,

Maier³

2019

Pres Stud Q

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“…Yet, in polities characterized by weak-or weakening-democratic institutions, populist rule might be an equilibrium solution between democracy and outright dictatorship. To explain how populist regimes work, I extended the notion of political transaction costs introduced in Zankina (2016) and Gurov and Zankina (2013). My point of departure was that, similarly to economic exchanges, political exchanges-transactions over political power, including elections, legislation, and execution of government policies-have transaction costs as well.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this sense, populist leaders are modern-day charismatic rulers who retain power as long as they are seen to work miracles: they appear to alter international relations, transform the economic system, or bring about a sense of "social justice" (Tismaneanu 2000). In that, they rely on their personal charisma, without which they cannot succeed: their power is personalized, and their followers depend on them personally (Gurov and Zankina 2013).…”

Section: What Is Authoritarian Populism? Theory and Empirical Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furubotn and Richter (2005, 55-57) considers the costs of setting up and maintaining social and political organizations such as political parties and state bureaucracies as political transaction costs. Yet, in political science, very few authors use the notion of political transaction costs, notable exceptions being Gurov and Zankina (2013) and Zankina (2016). 7.…”

Section: Disclosure Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Explaining Orbán: A Political Transaction Cost Theory of Authoritarian Populism

Ádám

2019

Problems of Post-Communism

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Based on the theory of transaction cost economics, the paper argues that by vertically organizing political exchange, populist regimes reduce market-type political transaction costs-bargaining, enforcement and information costs-of democracy. However, management-type political transaction costs-organizational costs, partly stemming from corruption-rise as populists in power leverage government control through hierarchically organized clienteles. Transaction cost economics suggest that a shift from democratic towards authoritarian populist regimes occurs when formal and informal political institutions prove unable to maintain horizontal political exchange, and demand for increased government discretion grows. This is demonstrated on Viktor Orbán's authoritarian populist regime in Hungary.

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“…Strong identification might not be conducive for liberal democracy if it is the effect of parties that are over-institutionalised, personalistic, heavily involved in patronage or cultivating clientelist linkages. Such linkages may promote electoral stability (Gherghina, 2014), but could in the longer run be even more dangerous for the quality of democracy than political fragmentation or party system dynamism (Enyedi, 2016;Gurov & Zankina, 2013;Schedler, 1995). Finally, large membership and forms of active engagement (e.g.…”

Section: Figure 3 Trends In Party Identification and Party Membershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Parties and Party Organisations

Sikk¹

2017

The Routledge Handbook of East European Politics

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Stable parties that successfully perform their representative function and connect to citizens are essential for democratic consolidation (Innes, 2002; Kreuzer & Pettai, 2004; Markowski, 2011; Tavits, 2013). Whether such parties will form in new European democracies has been questioned from early on (see Mair, 1997), but some degree of democratic stability has been achieved in the new East European EU member statesparticularly if we contrast them to most of the Former Soviet Union or Western Balkans. This chapter focuses on the development of political parties in countries that joined the EU in the first two waves; trends elsewhere in other post-communist countries differ considerably because of much lower levels of political stability or political freedoms. This chapter first looks at types of parties found in the region using a combination of two common approaches: party families and party development. The second section focusses in on the remarkably successful genuinely political parties without clear roots in the transition period and the related phenomenon of major parties suddenly becoming defunct. We then look at the internal life of parties through the analytical lens of party resources: symbiosis with the state, party organisations and membership. The conclusion summarises important trends since early 1990s and critically discusses the relationship between party development and democratic quality. PARTY TYPES Eastern Europe has been rich in the number and variety of political parties; to understand and analyse them, several approaches to party classification have been used. Party families is a classic and generally insightful approach that identifies similar parties across countries (Beyme, 1985; Hloušek & Kopeček, 2010). However, some parties defy easy classification, some families are internally diverse and parties can even change families. Also, it is not obvious why West European party families should provide a good guide to understanding parties elsewhere. Firstly, even if patterns of party competition in Eastern Europe have come to resemble Western Europe, a unique divisioncommunist legacyremains important in the former (Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2013, p.84). Secondly, many East European parties have traits that are at odds with their reference "families" in the West (for a discussion on centre-right see Hanley, 2004); others are programmatically vague or flexiblenote the transformation of Fidesz from a liberal to a conservative party (Kiss, 2002). A related approach to classification is based on parties' membership in European party organisations. Yet, sometimes foes in national politics sit together and close allies in different party groups in the European Parliament. For example, as of 2016, the Czech, Estonian, Lithuanian and Slovak delegations to European People's Party or the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats included parties both from national government and opposition benches. Three broad groups of parties can be distinguished using a developmental approach: (a) former communists, (b) p...

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Populism and the Construction of Political Charisma

Cited by 28 publications

References 23 publications

Donald Trump, Populism, and the Age of Extremes: Comparing the Personality Traits and Campaigning Styles of Trump and Other Leaders Worldwide

Donald Trump, Populism, and the Age of Extremes: Comparing the Personality Traits and Campaigning Styles of Trump and Other Leaders Worldwide

Explaining Orbán: A Political Transaction Cost Theory of Authoritarian Populism

Political Parties and Party Organisations

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