Populism and the Decline of Social Democracy

Berman, Sheri; Snegovaya, Maria

doi:10.1353/jod.2019.0038

Cited by 104 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…The durability of Western democracy may depend in part on the ability of mainstream left and right parties (or moderate factions within them) to attract those Westerners who are most open to authoritarian governance. These types of parties have played important roles in preserving Western democracy, the former by providing a democratically committed outlet to citizens unhappy with the outcomes of a capitalist economy (e.g., Berman 2006;Berman and Snegovaya 2019) and the latter by promoting stability and compromise while containing rightwing ethno-nationalism (Gidron and Ziblatt 2019;Ziblatt 2017). To the extent that these parties can split the culturally conservative vote along economic lines, the prospects for liberal democracy could well be improved.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who is Open to Authoritarian Governance within Western Democracies?

Malka¹,

Lelkes²,

Bakker³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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Recent events have raised concern about potential threats to democracy within Western countries. If Western citizens who are open to authoritarian governance share a common set of political preferences, then authoritarian elites can attract mass coalitions that are willing to subvert democracy to achieve shared ideological goals. With this in mind we explored which ideological groups are most open to authoritarian governance within Western general publics using World Values Survey data from fourteen Western democracies and three recent Latin American Public Opinion Project samples from Canada and the United States. Two key findings emerged. First, cultural conservatism was consistently associated with openness to authoritarian governance. Second, within half of the democracies studied, including all of the English-speaking ones, Western citizens holding a protection-based attitude package — combining cultural conservatism with left economic attitudes — were the most open to authoritarian governance. Within other countries, protection-based and consistently right-wing attitude packages were associated with similarly high levels of openness to authoritarian governance. We discuss implications for radical right populism and the possibility of splitting potentially undemocratic mass coalitions along economic lines.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who is Open to Authoritarian Governance within Western Democracies?

Malka¹,

Lelkes²,

Bakker³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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“…An era of mass migration led to increasing cultural conservatism and nationalism (Brubaker, 2017, 2020; Norris and Inglehart 2019). The convergence of center‐Right and center‐Left politicians and political parties disillusioned many voters, who felt increasingly that their political system offered them little real choice between broadly similar centrist options (Abdelal, forthcoming; Berger, 2017; Berman and Snegovaya, 2019; Guilluy, 2019; Hall, 2002; Hall and Evans, 2019; Mudge, 2018; Rodrik, 2016, 2019). Globalization, combined with automation and increasing returns to talent and education, created pressures for wage convergence among workers across the world with similar skills – and thereby inequality within developed countries (Rodrik, 2017, 2018).…”

Section: How America Fell Out Of Love With Globalizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dignity, Inequality, and the Populist Backlash: Lessons from America and Europe for a Sustainable Globalization

Abdelal¹

2020

Global Policy

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The greatest challenge to the sustainability of our current era of globalization comes from within the United States. Most Americans have come to reject globalization. We must discern the lessons from the parts of the developed world where the backlash is also profound-France, for exampleand where it has been more mutedsuch as Germany. In both the United States and France, gross Gini coefficients have increased sharply during the past thirty or so years. The French state has, however, delivered a net, after-tax, after-transfer distribution of income that is more equal than it was thirty years ago. And yet: France is still in the midst of an anti-systemic populist revolt. There is only one inescapable conclusion: it is not just about the money. Those who feel left behind in both countries feel that they have lost respect and dignity. We cannot redistribute our way out of the crisis of global capitalism. The German experience holds lessons. We must value and valorize the many ways in which people contribute. We must also pursue policies that create patterns of employment that confer dignity, meaning, and purpose. I argue for dignity as a tool of policy, beyond its normative desirability as a goal.

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“…Mass societal wealth -in both property and pensions -has at the same time become increasingly "financialized" and thereby exposed to rising risk (Chwieroth and A. Walter 2019). This may contribute to rising anxiety, a growing perception of relative deprivation, and resentment of the mainstream political elites that have promoted and supported such policy reforms, often over successive governments of the centre-right and centre-left (Berman and Snegovaya 2019;Evans and Tilley 2017;Guiso et al 2017;Massey 2013;Milner 2018;Mudge 2018).…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Consequences of Household Wealth Shocks: Evidence from Italy

Angioni

Chwieroth

Hopkin

et al. 2020

Preprint

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How do adverse shocks to household wealth influence domestic politics? Household wealth has become increasingly salient because rising financialization and trends in the cost and provision of crucial services have increased risks to many households. Wealth shocks can undermine support for mainstream political parties that have converged on policies perceived as contributing to the shock, compounding rising anxiety in the squeezed middle class and increasing the attractiveness of anti-system voting. This paper makes use of fine-grained time series data on household income and wealth in Italy to identify voters with greater exposure to these shocks, assessing how developments in the levels and distribution of household wealth, leverage, and financial vulnerability have shaped voter dissatisfaction with mainstream politics and promoted voting for populist parties since 1992. Results suggest that financial distress is indeed connected to populist voting. Wealthier parts of the electorate are more invested in the status quo, supporting parties that have demonstrated their commitment to fiscal and monetary orthodoxy. Nonetheless, some exposure to financial risk, such as share ownership or high levels of leverage, seem to push voters towards populist parties.

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Populism and the Decline of Social Democracy

Cited by 104 publications

References 24 publications

Who is Open to Authoritarian Governance within Western Democracies?

Who is Open to Authoritarian Governance within Western Democracies?

Dignity, Inequality, and the Populist Backlash: Lessons from America and Europe for a Sustainable Globalization

The Political Consequences of Household Wealth Shocks: Evidence from Italy

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