2022
DOI: 10.1177/13691481221075944
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Populism and the politicisation of foreign policy

Abstract: Populists in power often resort to the politicisation of foreign policy to generate domestic support. This article explores this process. First, it conceptualises populist politicisation of foreign policy. Second, it develops expectations on how such politicisation will take place: the distinctive features of populism (the intensity of populist discourse, the relative weight of anti-elitism and people-centrism, and a transnational understanding of the ‘people’ or the ‘elite’) will have an impact on how foreign… Show more

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Cited by 47 publications
(15 citation statements)
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“…4 The resulting corpus comprised 326 political speeches, consisting of 700,575 words. To follow the diachronic change in expression of anger in discourse, we created two subcorpora by taking the antigovernment Gezi protests 5 in 2013 in Turkey as a turning point after which Erdoğan's populism was intensified through the adoption of an increasingly antagonistic, authoritarian, conspiratorial, and nativist discursive style (Destradi et al, 2022;Ekşi & Wood, 2019;Taş, 2022). Table 5 shows the breakdown for the Pre-2013 and Post-2013 subcorpora.…”
Section: Corpusmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…4 The resulting corpus comprised 326 political speeches, consisting of 700,575 words. To follow the diachronic change in expression of anger in discourse, we created two subcorpora by taking the antigovernment Gezi protests 5 in 2013 in Turkey as a turning point after which Erdoğan's populism was intensified through the adoption of an increasingly antagonistic, authoritarian, conspiratorial, and nativist discursive style (Destradi et al, 2022;Ekşi & Wood, 2019;Taş, 2022). Table 5 shows the breakdown for the Pre-2013 and Post-2013 subcorpora.…”
Section: Corpusmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is a scholarly debate over defining populism. This study uses a definition based on the constructs of “people” and “elite” (Destradi et al, 2022) that incorporates Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser's (2013) minimal definition of populism. In this definition populism is described it as “a thin‐centered ideology” that divides the society into two equal and opposing camps of “pure people” and “corrupt elite.” In this definition, politics should be a manifestation of the common will of the people.…”
Section: Populism and Jihadi Governance In Iranmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…During the 2016 presidential election, Duterte positioned himself as the underdog poised to reclaim the sovereignty of the Philippines, which he perceived as having been taken away by the corrupted 'imperial Manila' elites. 60 Once in power, he skillfully harnessed both right-wing and left-wing ideological elements to gather support from a diverse array of domestic constituencies. He portrayed himself as a champion of the left while simultaneously earning the label 'penal populist' due to his 'law and order' orientation and strongman rhetoric against drugs and criminals.…”
Section: President Duterte Plays the Chinese Cardmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…110 On the domestic front, Erdogan framed the Syrian war, and Washington's support to the YPG, as a strategic manoeuvre by Western imperialist forces to fragment and exert control over the Middle East. 111 President Erdogan also suspected that the United States was behind the 2016 attempted military coup against his regime. This suspicion poisoned the relationship between the two countries and seriously affected their bond of trust.…”
Section: President Erdogan Plays the Russian Cardmentioning
confidence: 99%