Populist Reform Coalitions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Ghana’s Triple Alliance

Abstract

L'article explore la plus grande applicabilité d'un modéle influent destiné à expliquer comment les partis populistes sont capables d'entreprendre la libéralisation économique et maintenir malgré tout la viabilité électorale. Prenant en exemple le Ghana, l'article affirme que le modéle de Gibson dérivé de l'analyse de l'Amérique latine est un outil général utile mais qu'il ne s'applique pas aux cas africains à moins d'être profondément modifié. Dans l'Afrique sub-saharienne, les gouvernants héritiers du pouvoir ne sont disposés à le céder ni aux éléments technocratiques ni au capital privé, et, par contraste avec les cas latinoaméricains, ont construit leurs nouvelles coalitions politiques autour de facteurs externes. Par conséquent, l'analyse démontre que la période de réformes au Ghana sous Rawlings, sous couvert d'une rhétorique de changement systématique, est caractérisée par la continuité dans ses pratiques profondément institutionnalisées du patrimoine. L'analyse démontre aussi et la fragilité de la coalition de Rawlings et les perspectives improbables de développement économique associées avec la variante ghanéenne du populisme néo-libéral.

Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa

“…Eric Budd (2004) and Jay Oelbaum (2002) reinforce the claims made by Theobald and Englebert regarding the relationship between neopatrimonialism and poor developmental outcomes. Like Theobald, Budd indicates that patrimonialism is a structural feature of many states but is not an institution; as he states, "patrimonialism mitigates institutionalization" (2004:6).…”

“…These conditions included the following: " (1) the technical training should be available, (2) there must be a sufficiently powerful incentive to embark on such a policy-usually sharp competition... (3) a very special factor is necessary, namely, the participation of urban communes as a financial support in the competition" (1978[1922]:240). While Oelbaum (2002) seems to interpret the second of Weber's conditions as evidence that "Weber-not Charles Tilly as is typically claimed-is the actual author of the theory that war-making and modern state rationalization are two faces of the same coin" (291), the actual text does not specify that the "competition" is necessarily military; the context could suggest equally that the "sufficiently powerful incentive" is competition for trade and markets. As we shall see below, many of these conditions are similar to the emergence of a vibrant and productive market economy in postindependence Botswana.…”

Extractive industries transparency initiative and the politics of institutional innovation in Ghana's oil industry

“…Ghana's experience, however, reflects a broader trend whereby commitments to reform are deployed to reinforce elite control and legitimation, as evinced by the wider characterizations of extraversion or partial reform syndrome in the Africanist literature (see de Oliveira, 2007de Oliveira, , 2011van de Walle, 2001van de Walle, , 2003Lindberg, 2007). While noting the influential role of critical actors, such as donors and policy experts (see Libby, 1976;Whitfield, 2005), a common theme underscored by various analysts of Ghana's policy landscape is the appetite of the country's ruling elites for pursuing different reform initiatives largely as instrument of power consolidation (see Gibson, 1997;Oelbaum, 2002;Owusu, 1970Owusu, , 1996. Recent studies (e.g.…”

Between elite reflexes and deliberative impulses: oil and the landscape of contentious politics in Ghana

“…A common assumption embedded in analysis of the political economy of reform suggests that there is a trade-off between binding arrangements that permit reform and the consolidation of elite dominance and control over policy processes (for instance, Nye, 1967). Consequently, various commentaries and studies about Ghana's policy landscape remain divided between those who have emphasized the appetite among the ruling elites for pursuing various reform initiatives largely as an instrument of power (Gibson, 1997;Oelbaum, 2002;Ohemeng & Anebo, 2012;Owusu, 1970), and others who continue to underscore various vulnerabilities to the exercise of elite power that emanate from actors such as donors (Libby, 1976), policy experts (Ohemeng, 2005), and the private sector (Tangri, 1992). Beneath this lively discussion is the ever-swinging pendulum between elite centrality and the agency of social actors that continues to steer reform processes.…”