One of Saki Dockrill's most significant publications was her monograph, Britain's Retreat from East of Suez. 1 In this, the first archival study of the subject, she set Britain's reassessment of its defence priorities in a broad context, looking not only at withdrawal from Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf, but also at relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) over such questions as nuclear-sharing and the size of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). She showed that, in reducing spending, the British initially sought cuts in NATO; yet, by 1968, the Wilson government was set on a European future, eager to abandon the world role and enter the European Economic Community (EEC). Saki also looked at the debate over particular weapons systems, such as aircraft carriers and the US-manufactured F-111 aircraft, both vital to a world role. Some previous writers emphasised that the January 1968 decision to quit military bases East of Suez by the end of 1971, was the vital turning point in the process of retreat. 2 Others argued it merely marked an acceleration of earlier decisions, especially those announced in July 1967. 3 But, Saki looked further back, seeing harbingers of retreat under the Conservative governments of 1959-63. 4 Throughout the discussions, a vital question was the need to maintain friendly relations with London's main ally, the United States, which, concerned about its own defence burden, could hardly welcome Britain's retreat. This essay looks at the East of Suez debate from the vantage point of the US Ambassador in London, looking at how his embassy interpreted the various stages of British decisionmaking, how well it was informed about the debate and what it did to influence British leaders. 5