Positive Analyses of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policies

On reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs

“…By Lemmas 1 and 2, (a) implies that type 1's adoption boundary is located to the right of type2's. 11 The isocost curves are strictly upward sloping in each type's adoption region, and horizontal in its non-adoption region (since firms receive no subsidies when they do not adopt); see Lemma 3. The further to the south-east an isocost curve is located, the lower the associated total costs (lower taxes or larger subsidies).…”

“…We have simplified this figure by drawing them as straight lines, but this does not affect the interpretation of the results in any way. 11 The only point of intersection of the two firm types' adoption barriers is at 12 This assumption is made for expositional simplicity only. To make firms strictly prefer the policy aimed at their type, we only need to move ðS 1 ; t 1 Þ infinitesimally to the north-east into the region between K 1 and K 2 .…”

Instrumentos de política pública para la conservación: su nacimiento y evolución en Colombia

“…Los instrumentos diseñados e implementados para la protección del ambiente se clasifican de diferentes formas. Si bien las clasificaciones más básicas dividen a los instrumentos en dos grupos, enfoque directo (instrumentos de comando y control) y enfoque indirecto (instrumentos econó-micos o de mercado) (Pérez et al, 2010;Dietz y Vollebergh, 2002;CEPAL et al, 1998, Howlett, 2007, existen clasificaciones que han considerado diversas y novedosas categorías denominadas de la siguiente forma: regulación desafiante y acuerdos voluntarios (Russel y Powell, 2002;Barde, 1995), instituciones cooperativas (Hanley et al, 2007), políticas de información que involucran al público (Sterner, 2008;Banco Mundial, 1997), contratos (Horan y Shortle, 2001), instrumentos no obligatorios (Khanna, 2001), o instrumentos voluntarios (Parkhurst et al, 2002).…”

Agency Perceptions of Alternative Salinity Policies: The Role of Fairness

“…This linkage is implicit in the literature on the political economy of environmental policy (for example see Dietz and Vollebergh 1999).…”

“…Contradictory studies are cited by Dietz and Vollebergh (1999), who indicate that bureaucrats show little interest in the cost-efficiency of environmental policies.…”