Possession is Nine Points of the Law: The Political Economy of Early Public Land Disposal

Kanazawa, Mark

doi:10.1006/exeh.1996.0010

Cited by 27 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…A farmer could purchase 640 acres for $1.25/acre provided that he irrigated the entire plot 50 It appears as if first possession as a norm for allocating rights works well when scarcity is not high -the region J-K in Figure 2. For an excellent analysis of the political economy of the use of first possession in the U.S. Midwest see Kanazawa, Mark T. (1996). For the general use of first possession to allocate property rights see Lueck (2003) and Libecap (2007).…”

Section: Settlement Of the Us Frontiermentioning

confidence: 99%

De Facto and De Jure Property Rights: Land Settlement and Land Conflict on the Australian, Brazilian and U.S. Frontiers

2009

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We present a conceptual framework to better understand the interaction between settlement and the emergence of de facto property rights on frontiers prior to governments establishing and enforcing de jure property rights. In this framework, potential rents associated with more exclusivity drives "demand" for commons arrangements but demand is not a sufficient explanation; norms and politics matter. At some point enhanced scarcity will drive demand for more exclusivity beyond which can be sustained with commons arrangements. Claimants will therefore petition government for de jure property rights to their claims -formal titles. Land conflict will be minimal when governments supply property rights to first possessors. But, governments may not allocate de jure rights to these claimants because they face differing political constituencies. Moreover, governments may assign de jure rights but be unwilling to enforce the right. This generates potential or actual conflict over land depending on the violence potentials of de facto and de jure claimants. We examine land settlement and conflict on the frontiers of Australia, the U.S. and Brazil. We are interested in examining the emergence, sustainability, and collapse of commons arrangements in specific historical contexts. Our analysis indicates the emergence of de facto property rights arrangements will be relatively peaceful where claimants have reasons to organize collectively (Australia and the U.S.). The settlement process will be more prone to conflict when fewer collective activities are required. Consequently, claimants resort to periodic violent self-enforcement or third party enforcement (Brazil). In all three cases the movement from de facto to de jure property rights led to potential or actual conflict because of insufficient government enforcement.JEL classification: D72; Q15; N40; N50; 017; K11 * For comments we thank

show abstract

Section: Settlement Of the Us Frontiermentioning

confidence: 99%

De Facto and De Jure Property Rights: Land Settlement and Land Conflict on the Australian, Brazilian and U.S. Frontiers

2009

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Table 1 lists the major federal land laws enacted by Congress that distributed property rights to land and minerals on the frontier. The demand for free small freeholds was incorporated into policy, beginning with the Preemption Act of 1830 and its many amendments (Kanazawa, 1996) to accommodate and legally recognize squatter claims and on through the Homestead Act of 1862 and its adjustments. The Homestead Act effectively was ended by Congress in 1934.…”

Section: Figure 1: the Progression Of The Frontiermentioning

confidence: 99%

Property Rights to Frontier Land and Minerals: US Exceptionalism

Libecap¹

2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Property rights are the most fundamental institution in any society. They determine who has decision-making authority over assets and who bears the costs and benefits of those decisions. They assign ownership, wealth, political influence, and social standing. They make markets possible; define timelines; and provide incentives for investment, innovation, and trade. They mitigate the losses of open access and provide the basis for long-term economic growth. Economists and economic historians have long recognized the importance of secure property rights for economic outcomes. Other political economy, philosophy, historical, and legal literatures emphasize different, but critical attributes based on how property rights are allocated and to whom. The linkages among the social, political, and economic effects are examined here with respect to US and Latin American frontier land and minerals. Property rights were sharply different across the two frontiers with apparent long-term consequences for economic growth, innovation, wealth distribution, private investment in public goods, as well as social and political stability. The distinct assignment of property rights to land and minerals is likely a basis for long-term US exceptionalism in economic performance, individualism, mobility, and optimism. The mechanisms through which property rights to land in a frontier society affect outcomes in a contemporary, highly urban one are complex. Because property rights to land were broadly distributed, Americans could participate in capital markets using land as collateral. This ability shaped opinions regarding markets, capitalism, and individual opportunity. In the 21st century, these critical attributes may be eroding, inviting more analysis from economists and economic historians. Introduction.The above quotation points to attributes of property rights that are more individualistic, social, and political than are those emphasized in most economic discussions. Nevertheless, there are direct linkages across these characteristics, and emphasizing the relationships is the focus of this Chapter. Attention is directed to frontiers in North and South America where property rights were distributed to land and minerals in very dissimilar ways, seemingly leading to starkly different consequences-economic, political, and social. These varying frontier experiences appear to have had long-term consequences. Frontiers provide a natural experiment because, by definition, they are areas where new rights to resources are emerging. The discussion is based on the existing literature and does not provide tests of hypotheses regarding property rights and various outcomes. Causality between property rights structures and observed variation in immigration patterns, middle class development, innovation, social and political cohesion, individualism, reduced reliance upon the state, private investment in public goods as well as, long-term economic growth seems, however, to be supported by available research.Property rights are the most fundamental inst...

show abstract

“…In Buenos Aires, the threat was great, making it too risky to settle without military campaigns to secure new land. By contrast, in NSW, the risk from Aboriginal 44 On this point, see Kanazawa (1996) on the political economy of land disposal by auction and preemption in the United States. Our findings support a factor-endowments explanation, but they warn against oversimplified notions of how property-rights emerge in neo-Europes.…”

Section: [Insert Figure 5 About Here]mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Land Privatization in Argentina and Australia, 1810–1850: A Puzzle

Dye¹,

Croix²

2013

J. Econ. Hist.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Possession is Nine Points of the Law: The Political Economy of Early Public Land Disposal

Cited by 27 publications

References 13 publications

De Facto and De Jure Property Rights: Land Settlement and Land Conflict on the Australian, Brazilian and U.S. Frontiers

De Facto and De Jure Property Rights: Land Settlement and Land Conflict on the Australian, Brazilian and U.S. Frontiers

Property Rights to Frontier Land and Minerals: US Exceptionalism

The Political Economy of Land Privatization in Argentina and Australia, 1810–1850: A Puzzle

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About