Possible roles for semantics and syntax in a government-binding structure

Abstract

As described, for example, by Hornstein, the general linguistic framework given by the contemporary government-binding theory distinguishes several levels. This paper is intended to show that a differentiation of that kind, if such levels are understood in a different manner, can be clearly consistent with some developments in current cognitive science, and, in particular, with approaches such as the one of López-Astorga, which attempts to link proposals that, in principle, can be deemed as irreconcilable, such as the mental models theory and the idea that human cognition is led by logical forms. In this way, without accepting the characteristics that usually are assigned to the levels pointed out by the government-binding theory, it is argued that the role attributed to semantics and syntax by López-Astorga can be compatible with a general structure more or less akin to the one of this last theory.

Logical Forms Depend on Semantic Models: the Illusory Disjunctive Sentences as Pieces of Evidence

“…Nevertheless, according to those very works, that does not mean that syntax has to be rejected, since the method of analysis used by the theory also allows deriving from it the real logical forms corresponding to sentences in natural language. López-Astorga (2019) shows that this last point does not cause any problems to the theory of mental models, and that it is possible to speak about iconic models and logical forms at once under the same approach. This is exactly what will also be argued here from another perspective, the one of the illusory disjunctive sentences.…”

“…However, it might also lead one to a very important philosophical and linguistic consequence: it makes logical form superfluous. This is so because, as pointed out, the main idea of the theory seems to be that human reasoning has nothing to do with formal structures, and that it is mainly related to iconic models or possibilities (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2012;López-Astorga, 2019). This paper will follow the general theoretical line of works such as López-Astorga (2017, 2019).…”

“…This paper will follow the general theoretical line of works such as López-Astorga (2017, 2019). López-Astorga (2017, 2019 proposes that, indeed, reasoning is made as the theory of mental models claims. Nevertheless, according to those very works, that does not mean that syntax has to be rejected, since the method of analysis used by the theory also allows deriving from it the real logical forms corresponding to sentences in natural language.…”

“…Therefore, the novelty that will be presented below is that this relation between semantics and syntax will be reviewed by analyzing an example that seems not to have been dealt with from the point of view of works such as the ones of López-Astorga (2017, 2019. That is the case of certain disjunctive sentences that people usually tend to consider as totally true under any circumstance, that is, in Kantian terminology, that people tend to deem as 'analytic' (or, by using a concept provided by Carnap, 1947, 'L-true'), when, actually, they do not have that characteristic.…”

Semantic ambiguity does not imply syntactic ambiguity

“…The account that can be given for that problem from the theory of mental models is relatively simple (see LÓPEZ-ASTORGA, 2019a, where is basically presented the explanation that will be described in this section). The theory proposes to assign iconic possibilities -called 'models' -to expressions in natural language (see also, e.g., HINTERECKER, KNAUFF, & JOHNSON-LAIRD, 2016;JOHNSON-LAIRD, 2012JOHNSON-LAIRD, KHEMLANI, & GOODWIN, 2015;KHEMLANI & JOHNSON-LAIRD, 2019;LÓPEZ-ASTORGA, 2019b;QUELHAS, RASGA, & JOHNSON-LAIRD, 2017). Obviously, such models iconically stand for different situations in which an utterance can be true.…”