Possible World Semantics and True‐True Counterfactuals

Walters, Lee

doi:10.1111/papq.12067

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…Thus, it is the responsibility of the opponent of CC to either give a new semantics that invalidates CC and argue for the adequacy of its other logical properties, or conservatively modify the standard semantics so that CC becomes invalid while other desirable logical properties of the standard semantics are kept intact. However, as Walters (2016) shows, many of such anti-CC semantic attempts in the literature throw the baby out with the bath water (suppose CC is indeed bath water). Furthermore, the failure of these anti-CC proposals might not be a mere accident.…”

Section: Fanmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For another, a more detailed pragmatic story can be told in a very standard way. For example, Walters (2016) suggests that Grice's Maxim of Quantity is responsible in this case. As

φ \land ψ

is logically stronger than

φ > ψ

(given the validity of CC), uttering

φ > ψ

is a violation of the Maxim of Quantity, unless the speaker intended to convey that

φ > ψ

is true in a way independent of

φ \land ψ

, that is, it is true because of the relevance between

φ

and

ψ

.…”

Section: A Pluralistic Pragmatic Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, the result at the very least shows that there is no genuinely conservative modification of Lewis's semantics: we cannot subtract CC from VC and be satisfied with the resulting logic VW, as VW entails instances of CC whenever the semantic assumption (S) holds. As shown in Walters (2016), semantics approaches invalidating CC in the literature all fail to preserve the whole of VW.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Focused true–true counterfactuals

Fan

2023

The Philosophical Forum

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Any counterfactual with a true antecedent and a true consequent is invariably predicted to be true by the standard Stalnaker–Lewis semantics. But many such true–true counterfactuals appear false to ordinary speakers, which is considered by many authors as evidence that the standard semantics should be revised. However, Walters and Williams prove that allowing true–true counterfactuals to be false would unacceptably invalidate some very plausible logical principles. The objective of this paper is to provide a pragmatic account of seemingly false true–true counterfactuals, which explains why such counterfactuals seem false to ordinary speakers while being true semantically. In particular, a pluralistic pragmatic account is pursued: I argue that some true–trues seem false because they conversationally implicate some falsehood, and some others seem false because the focus (intonation stress) involved in them invokes some pragmatic re‐interpretation that affects speakers' truth‐value judgments.

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Section: Fanmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For another, a more detailed pragmatic story can be told in a very standard way. For example, Walters (2016) suggests that Grice's Maxim of Quantity is responsible in this case. As

φ \land ψ

is logically stronger than

φ > ψ

(given the validity of CC), uttering

φ > ψ

is a violation of the Maxim of Quantity, unless the speaker intended to convey that

φ > ψ

is true in a way independent of

φ \land ψ

, that is, it is true because of the relevance between

φ

and

ψ

.…”

Section: A Pluralistic Pragmatic Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Focused true–true counterfactuals

Fan

2023

The Philosophical Forum

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“…Moreover, true-true subjunctive conditional face the additional problem that they are trivially true according to the standard counterfactual semantics of Lewis (1973) and Stalnaker (1968). For discussions of this problem and for potential solutions, see McGlynn (2012), Cogburn and Roland (2013), and Walters (2016). In this paper, I will not address these issues concerning true-true subjunctives.…”

Section: Safetymentioning

confidence: 99%

Sensitivity, safety, and impossible worlds

Melchior

2020

Philos Stud

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Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known problems when it comes to knowledge of necessities. Beliefs in necessities are trivially sensitive and safe and, therefore, trivially constitute knowledge according to these accounts. In this paper, I will first argue that existing solutions to this necessity problem, which accept standard possible-worlds semantics, are unsatisfactory. In order to solve the necessity problem, I will utilize an unorthodox account of counterfactuals, as proposed by Nolan (Notre Dame J Formal Logic 38:535-572, 1997), on which we also consider impossible worlds. Nolan's account for counterpossibles delivers the intuitively correct result for sensitivity i.e. S's belief is sensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge of necessities and insensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge failure. However, we acquire the same plausible result for safety only if we reject his strangeness of impossibility condition and accept the modal closeness of impossible worlds. In this case, the necessity problem can be analogously solved for sensitivity and safety. For some, such non-moderate accounts might come at too high a cost. In this respect, sensitivity is better off than safety when it comes to knowing necessities.

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“…30 This argument that nʹ counterfactually depends on my feeling thirsty may look like it erroneously assumes the transitivity of the counterfactual conditional, but in fact it does not. Since it is true that if neither n nor my feeling thirsty had occurred then nʹ would not have occurred either, all I require is that the counterfactual conditional obey limited transitivity-a principle about conditionals which holds the rare distinction of not being the target of any counterexamples in the literature (Walters, 2016): That said, DERIVATION is inconsistent with some antecedently plausible ways of grounding high level causation in lower level causation. In particular, it entails the falsity of the thesis that each high level f caused g is grounded in every relationship p caused q such that (i) p is low level and grounds f and (ii) q grounds or is identical to g, as well as a strengthened version of this thesis that changes (i) to require only that p ground f. To see why, consider the high level causal relationship between my thirst and my drinking, and the low level causal relationships between n and my drinking.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%