Post-conflict slowing: cognitive adaptation after conflict processing

Verguts, Tom; Notebaert, Wim; Kunde, Wilfried; Wühr, Peter

doi:10.3758/s13423-010-0016-2

Cited by 84 publications

(93 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Data from a 1,094,886-trial lexical decision task showed that people slow down after an error, and a diffusion model decomposition showed that this slowdown can be attributed almost exclusively to an increase in response caution. This result confirms the traditional explanation of PES in terms of selfregulation and cognitive control (e.g., Botvinick et al, 2001;Cohen et al, 2000;Brewer & Smith, 1989;Fitts, 1966;Hajcak et al, 2003;Li et al, 2006;Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977;Shiels & Hawk, 2010;Smith & Brewer, 1995;Tops & Boksem, 2010;Verguts, Notebaert, Kunde, & Wühr, 2011;Vickers & Lee, 1998): that is, people adaptively change their response thresholds to a possibly nonstationary environmentby becoming more daring after each correct response, and by becoming more cautious after each error, people reach an optimal state of homeostasis that is characterized by fast responses and few errors.…”

Section: Concluding Commentssupporting

confidence: 74%

Testing Theories of Post-Error Slowing

Dutilh¹,

Vandekerckhove²,

Forstmann³

et al. 2011

PsycEXTRA Dataset

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People tend to slow down after they make an error. This phenomenon, generally referred to as post-error slowing, has been hypothesized to reflect perceptual distraction, time wasted on irrelevant processes, a priori bias against the response made in error, increased variability in a priori bias, or an increase in response caution. Although the response caution interpretation has dominated the empirical literature, little research has attempted to test this interpretation in the context of a formal process model. Here we used the drift diffusion model to isolate and identify the psychological processes responsible for post-error slowing. In a lexical decision data set comprised of 1,094,886 responses we found that post-error slowing was associated with an increase in response caution and-to a lesser extent-a change in response bias. In the present data set, we found no evidence that post-error slowing is caused by perceptual distraction or time wasted on irrelevant processes. These results support a response monitoring account of post-error slowing.

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Section: Concluding Commentssupporting

confidence: 74%

Testing Theories of Post-Error Slowing

Dutilh¹,

Vandekerckhove²,

Forstmann³

et al. 2011

PsycEXTRA Dataset

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show abstract

“…1a). However, such "postconflict slowing" is hard to interpret when the conflict-laden irrelevant stimulus features repeat, as was the case here (see Verguts et al, 2011, for a discussion of this issue). We therefore refrain from an extended discussion of this observation.…”

Section: Discussion Of Experiments 1a and 1bmentioning

confidence: 78%

“…This finding should be viewed with caution, however, first because postconflict slowing is hard to interpret when the taskinterfering features repeat from trial to trial (cf. Verguts et al, 2011), and second because the effect was not replicated in Experiment 3.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adaptation to (non)valent task disturbance

Kunde

Augst²,

Kleinsorge

2012

Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci

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The cognitive system adapts to disturbances caused by task-irrelevant information. For example, interference due to irrelevant spatial stimulation (e.g., the spatial Simon effect) typically diminishes right after a spatially incongruent event. These adaptation effects reflect processes that help to overcome the impact of task-irrelevant information. Interference with (or interruption of) task processing can also result from valent (i.e., positive or negative) stimuli, such as in the "affective Simon" task. In the present study, we tested whether the resolution of valence-based task disturbances generalizes to the resolution of other cognitive (spatial) types of interference, and vice versa. Experiments 1 and 2 explored the interplay of adaptation effects triggered by spatial and affective interference. Incongruent spatial information modified the spatial Simon effect but not affective interference effects, whereas incongruent affective information modified affective interference effects to some extent, but not spatial Simon effects. In Experiment 3, we investigated the interplay of adaptation effects triggered by spatial interference and by the interruption of task processing from valent information that did not overlap with the main task ("emotional Stroop" effect). Again we observed domain-specific adaptation for the spatial Simon effect but found no evidence for cross-domain modulations. We assume that the processes used to resolve task disturbance from irrelevant affective and spatial information operate in largely independent manners.

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“…The adaptation by binding model explains these adaptation effects by assuming that the continuous exposure to conflicting situations increases the associative learning so connections between relevant units become very strong. As a consequence, the influence of irrelevant units (word input units) decreases and the Stroop effect reduces (see Verguts, Notebaert, Kunde, & Wühr, 2011, for an elaboration on cognitive control, conflict resolution, and adaptation to conflicting situations). On the other hand, the conflict monitoring theory would defend that conflict adaptation would result from the continuous increased attention to the task-relevant units after responding to many conflicting trials.…”

mentioning

confidence: 97%

Conflict resolution in two-digit number processing: evidence of an inhibitory mechanism

Macizo

2015

Psychological Research

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We investigated the mechanism involved in conflict resolution when individuals processed two-digit numbers. Participants performed a comparison task in blocks of two trials. In the first trial, between-decade two-digit numbers were used in a compatible condition where the decade and the unit of one number were larger than those of the other number (i.e., 21-73) and an incompatible condition where the decade of one number was larger but the unit was smaller than those of the other number (i.e., 61-53). In the second trial, within-decade two-digit numbers were presented in a related condition where the numbers contained the units presented previously (i.e., 41-43) and an unrelated condition with units that did not appear before (i.e., 48-49). In the first trial, participants responded more slowly in incompatible trials relative to compatible trials. In the second trial, participants were slower in the related condition relative to unrelated trials only after incompatible trials. These results suggest that participants experienced conflict in the incompatible condition of first trial and that they inhibited irrelevant units to resolve conflict.

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Post-conflict slowing: cognitive adaptation after conflict processing

Cited by 84 publications

References 16 publications

Testing Theories of Post-Error Slowing

Testing Theories of Post-Error Slowing

Adaptation to (non)valent task disturbance

Conflict resolution in two-digit number processing: evidence of an inhibitory mechanism

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