Post-Crisis Banking Regulation in the European Union

Sum, Katarzyna

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-41378-5

Cited by 6 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…In the literature, bank lending is mainly proxied either by domestic bank credit to the private sector (see Barth et al, 2004;Cottarelli et al, 2005;Amidu, 2014;Fratzscher et al, 2016;Cerutti et al, 2017;Merrouche and Nier, 2017;Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018;Revelo et al, 2020) or total bank loans (see Ko sak et al, 2015;Sum, 2016;Ibrahim and Rizvi, 2018;Klingelh€ ofer and Sun, 2019;G omez et al, 2020;Hsieh and Lee, 2020). However, this study follows Barth et al (2004), Cottarelli et al (2005) and Merrouche and Nier (2017) by using a more standard measure of bank lending, which is bank credit to the domestic private sector as a share of gross domestic product (GDP).…”

Section: Data Sources and Descriptive Analysis 31 Data Sourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With this analysis, the paper contributes to the literature on the effects of bank regulation on bank lending. There is a growing number of studies assessing how the following bank regulatory measures influence bank lending: bank entry barriers (see Barth et al, 2004;Cottarelli et al, 2005;Amidu, 2014;Merrouche and Nier, 2017), restrictions on the mixing of banking and commerce as well as on bank activities (see Barth et al, 2004;Amidu, 2014;Sum, 2016;Merrouche and Nier, 2017;Ibrahim and Rizvi, 2018;Hsieh and Lee, 2020) and capital regulations (see Amidu, 2014;Bridges et al, 2014;Ko sak et al, 2015;Fratzscher et al, 2016;Sum, 2016;Merrouche and Nier, 2017;Ibrahim and Rizvi, 2018;Temesvary, 2018;Hsieh and Lee, 2020) [1]. However, the evidence from these studies on how bank regulation affects bank lending is inconclusive.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…, 2005; Amidu, 2014; Merrouche and Nier, 2017), restrictions on the mixing of banking and commerce as well as on bank activities (see Barth et al. , 2004; Amidu, 2014; Sum, 2016; Merrouche and Nier, 2017; Ibrahim and Rizvi, 2018; Hsieh and Lee, 2020) and capital regulations (see Amidu, 2014; Bridges et al. , 2014; Košak et al.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…, 2015; Fratzscher et al. , 2016; Sum, 2016; Merrouche and Nier, 2017; Ibrahim and Rizvi, 2018; Temesvary, 2018; Hsieh and Lee, 2020) [1]. However, the evidence from these studies on how bank regulation affects bank lending is inconclusive.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Nonlinear effects of bank regulation stringency on bank lending in selected sub-Saharan African countries

Thamae

Odhiambo²

2022

IJOEM

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PurposeThis paper aims to investigate the nonlinear effects of bank regulation stringency on bank lending in 23 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over the period 1997–2017.Design/methodology/approachThis study employs the dynamic panel threshold regression (PTR) model, which addresses endogeneity and heterogeneity problems within a nonlinear framework. It also uses indices of entry barriers, mixing of banking and commerce restrictions, activity restrictions and capital regulatory requirements from the updated databases of the World Bank's Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys as measures of bank regulation.FindingsThe linearity test results support the existence of nonlinear effects in the relationship between bank lending and entry barriers or capital regulations in the selected SSA economies. The dynamic PTR estimation results reveal that bank lending responds positively when the stringency of entry barriers is below the threshold of 62.8%. However, once the stringency of entry barriers exceeds that threshold level, bank credit reacts negatively and significantly. By contrast, changes in capital regulation stringency do not affect bank lending, either below or above the obtained threshold value of 76.5%.Practical implicationsThese results can help policymakers design bank regulatory measures that will promote the resilience and safety of the banking system but at the same time not bring unintended effects to bank lending.Originality/valueTo the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine the nonlinear effects of bank regulatory measures on bank lending using the dynamic PTR model and SSA context.

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Section: Data Sources and Descriptive Analysis 31 Data Sourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Nonlinear effects of bank regulation stringency on bank lending in selected sub-Saharan African countries

Thamae

Odhiambo²

2022

IJOEM

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“…(Bank of England 2012:5) However, 'it is an illusion to believe that there is a single, superior model of institutional structure that is applicable to all countries' (Llewellyn 2006:7). In addition to other criteria, the structure of the banking sector and the financial sector as a whole would need to play a role in the selection of a suitable model (Sum 2016).…”

Section: Literature Review Bank Regulation As a Necessitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Assembly of a conduct risk regulatory model for developing market banks

Hargarter

Vuuren

2017

SAJEMS

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Background: The substantial penalties imposed on banks in the recent past for various conduct irregularities have given rise to a new type of risk called conduct risk. Conduct risk comes about when financial services companies conduct themselves in an inappropriate way towards their customers, resulting in a negative (economic) outcome for the customer. What makes the management and mitigation of conduct risk by banks so different is that it cannot be easily integrated into a bank’s standard risk management framework. So far, the concept of conduct risk has not been formally covered by the Basel Accords.Aim: There are, however, global efforts by international organisations and local regulators to control it – with little clarity on the ‘how’. The aim of this study is to explore this ‘how’.Setting: While regulators need to protect customers, resulting in a positive outcome for the customer, they must also ensure that banks take conduct risk management and its mitigation seriously. At the same time, any regulatory model for conduct risk needs to be incorporated into the existing bank regulatory strategy and methodology and assimilated with the profile of a country.Methods: An exploratory model that regulators could use to keep conduct risk at bay is developed based on primary and secondary data and this is then applied to the South African, Kenyan and Malaysian milieus to determine what can be learnt about conduct risk in emerging economies.Results: The model investigates the interrelationships between different goals that regulators ideally need to achieve and the findings show that regulators have a difficult task balancing these goals and at the same time achieving a positive outcome.Conclusion: Based on the model, the recommendation for regulators in the developing world would be to collaborate in their approach to conduct risk, as they might face similar difficulties and operate in a comparable context.

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Regulatory Tools to Deal with the Banking Lending Risks

Peridis¹

2022

EBI Studies in Banking and Capital Markets Law

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Post-Crisis Banking Regulation in the European Union

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Nonlinear effects of bank regulation stringency on bank lending in selected sub-Saharan African countries

Nonlinear effects of bank regulation stringency on bank lending in selected sub-Saharan African countries

Assembly of a conduct risk regulatory model for developing market banks

Regulatory Tools to Deal with the Banking Lending Risks

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