Post-Olympic Use of the Olympic Venues: The Case of Greece

Abstract

The 2004 Athens Olympic Games provided the host city with a unique challenge to ensure long-term benefits and to present itself worldwide as a modern, well designed and well run metropolis with infrastructure and state-of-the-art facilities, promoting the quality of life for its residents, as well as its economic and cultural development. The way however that the huge and costly sports facilities, unanimously acknowledged as a burden on the national economy and the Greek taxpayers, were to be used and exploited after the Games, became a headache to all post-games governments. The post-Olympic era was largely characterised by the incapability of the government to productively utilize the extensive infrastructure of the Olympic games. The bureaucracy and the lack of governmental long-term planning, left most venues unexploited and abandoned right after the games. Hellenic Olympic Properties (HOP), a government-controlled company responsible for making use of each of the Olympic venues after the games was extremely slow and inefficient in the utilization of its assets, while its annual published financial statements revealed consistently negative bottom lines. Seven years after the games, the reality is that the expected benefits from the post-Olympic use of the facilities to the Greek economy still remain to be seen.

The Legacy of the Olympic Games: A Review

“…For other hosts controversial information exists (Beijing 2008, Montreal 1976 or problems with the sporting legacy (venues were underused at first but became popular over time) were reported (Athens 2004, Sydney 2000) (e.g. Kasimati, 2015;Searle, 2012). However, empirical data to support these evaluations are missing as well as methods to measure if a venue's post-Games use is successful or not.…”

The Dissension over the Logic of European Cohesion Policy. The Core-Periphery Divide and the Impact on European Integration

“…More recent research suggests above all the inefficient use of the funds in Greece, as well as the role played by party politics in squandering much of the country's structural funds (see Trantidis, 2016). The best example is the megalomaniac decision to hold the Olympic Games in Athens, a city whose infrastructure is largely unused and decaying (Kasimati, 2015;Liargovas, Petropoulos, Tzikfakis & Huliaras, 2016). Elsewhere in 'Club Med', Italy has been unable to overcome its long-standing north-south divide.…”

Cost and Revenue Overruns of the Olympic Games 2000–2018

“…Another example is the final costs for Athens 2004 . We used the data from Panagiotopoulou (2014), as she had data from the government, which we trusted more than the data from Kasimati (2015) .…”

“…For the IBC/MPC, we had data only from London 2012, which had a cost overrun of 103% . 2010; Kasimati (2015); London 2012 Candidate City 2004; NSW (2002); OCA (1999OCA ( , 2002; Rio 2016 Candidate City 2008; Sydney Olympics 2000Bid Limited (1993; The Audit Office (1999,2002) The overall cost overruns were calculated as an average of the available data . Two out of two 24 host cities had cost overruns .…”