Post-Quantum Authenticated Encryption against Chosen-Ciphertext Side-Channel Attacks

Azouaoui, Melissa; Kuzovkova, Yulia; Schneider, Tobias; Vredendaal, Christine van

doi:10.46586/tches.v2022.i4.372-396

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…A negacyclic rotation of the message may be achieved by multiplying both u and v by an indeterminate X, provided that c is created correctly. Decode (-y) and decode (y) can evaluate different values, which is why this approach may result in mistakes for specific ciphertexts used in secret key recovery attempts [51,52].…”

Section: Attacks Against Crystals-kybermentioning

confidence: 99%

Investigating CRYSTALS-Kyber Vulnerabilities: Attack Analysis and Mitigation

Iavich,

Kuchukhidze

2024

Cryptography

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Significant advancements have been achieved in the field of quantum computing in recent years. If somebody ever creates a sufficiently strong quantum computer, many of the public-key cryptosystems in use today might be compromised. Kyber is a post-quantum encryption technique that depends on lattice problem hardness, and it was recently standardized. Despite extensive testing by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), new investigations have demonstrated the effectiveness of CRYSTALS-Kyber attacks and their applicability in non-controlled environments. We investigated CRYSTALS-Kyber’s susceptibility to side-channel attacks. In the reference implementation of Kyber512, additional functions can be compromised by employing the selected ciphertext. The implementation of the selected ciphertext allows the attacks to succeed. Real-time recovery of the entire secret key is possible for all assaults.

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Section: Attacks Against Crystals-kybermentioning

confidence: 99%

Investigating CRYSTALS-Kyber Vulnerabilities: Attack Analysis and Mitigation

Iavich,

Kuchukhidze

2024

Cryptography

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“…In [18], the authors proposed the use of a conceptually simple construction, the Encryptthen-Sign (E tS) KEM that reduces the impact of CC-SCA. This construction uses the paradigm introduced by Zheng et al [19] and analyzed by An et al [20], and it instantiates a post-quantum authenticated KEM in the outsider-security model.…”

Section: Side-channel Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of the FO Transformation in the Lattice-Based Post-Quantum Algorithms

2022

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Newer variants of the Fujisaki–Okamoto transformation are used in most candidates of the third round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization call in the category of public key encryption schemes. These transformations are applied to obtain a highly secure key encapsulation mechanism from a less secure public key encryption scheme. Furthermore, there are five candidates (three finalists and two alternatives) that passed to the third round of the process and whose security is based in lattice problems. This work analyzes the different ways in which the lattice-based candidates of the NIST call apply the Fujisaki–Okamoto transformation and the particularities of each application. The study of such differences and their repercussion in the design of the proposals will allow a better understanding of the algorithms. Moreover, we propose a modification of the Kyber algorithm—the only public key encryption candidate established as a PQC standard by NIST in its more recent publication—in order to avoid the re-encryption in the decapsulation algorithm and, in this way, to reduce the side channel attacks vulnerability.

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“…Additionally, one crucial aspect is to guarantee that no sensitive information is leaked in the implementation of a post-quantum algorithm. Additionally, several post-quantum constructions are particularly vulnerable to Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) that exploit specifically chosen ciphertexts to amplify the observed leakage, known as Chosen-Ciphertext Side-Channel Analysis (CC-SCA), [2]. The security evaluation of post-quantum schemes against attacks and the development of effective countermeasures to mitigate them are open research topics [3].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Simple Power Analysis of an FPGA implementation of a polynomial multiplier for the NTRU cryptosystem

Camacho-Ruiz,

Sánchez-Solano,

Martínez-Rodríguez

et al. 2023

2023 38th Conference on Design of Circuits and Integrated Systems (DCIS)

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As quantum computing technology advances, the security of traditional cryptographic systems is becoming increasingly vulnerable. To address this issue, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has emerged as a promising solution that can withstand the brute force of quantum computers. However, PQC is not immune to attacks that exploit weaknesses in implementation, such as Side Channel Attacks (SCAs). SCAs can extract secret keys by analyzing the physical characteristics such as power consumption of the device while performing cryptographic operation. Simple Power Analysis (SPA) is a type of SCA that uses power consumption measurements to extract sensitive information. By applying SPA to a specific hardware implementation of a PQC algorithm such as the NTRU, potential vulnerabilities can appear in the Arithmetic Unit (AU) in charge of the multiplication operation. The effectiveness of this analysis to extract sensitive information has been evaluated through extensive experiments in which different countermeasures and strategies have been proposed, as well as an accelerated algorithm has been implemented. The results demonstrate that SPA can point out security breaches in the NTRU implementation, indicating an issue that can affect the PQC in the future.

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Post-Quantum Authenticated Encryption against Chosen-Ciphertext Side-Channel Attacks

Cited by 9 publications

References 15 publications

Investigating CRYSTALS-Kyber Vulnerabilities: Attack Analysis and Mitigation

Investigating CRYSTALS-Kyber Vulnerabilities: Attack Analysis and Mitigation

Analysis of the FO Transformation in the Lattice-Based Post-Quantum Algorithms

A Simple Power Analysis of an FPGA implementation of a polynomial multiplier for the NTRU cryptosystem

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