Post-Quantum Hardware Security

Covic, Ana; Chowdhury, Sreeja; Acharya, Rabin Yu; Ganji, Fatemeh; Forte, Domenic

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-64448-2_8

Cited by 1 publication

(3 citation statements)

References 68 publications

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“…The optical medium plays the role of a token, which is technologically hard to clone and it can produce a large number of independent, almost truly random keys, each one associated with different parameters of the input laser light (e.g., wavelength, power, wavefront, angle of incidence, etc.). Following the work of Pappu et al, PUFs have attracted considerable attention over the last two decades or so, and the related literature is rather rich [26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33]. Currently, there are different types of PUFs, including optical (non-silicon) PUFs, time-delay-based silicon PUFs, intrinsic silicon PUFs, magnetic PUFs, etc.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For our purposes, it is sufficient to know the basic operation of a PUF, which is the generation of random keys, leaving aside details that go beyond the scope of the present work. An interested reader may refer to the related review articles [26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33], and the references therein.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By contrast, strong PUFs support a much larger set of CRPs and an attacker must have access to the PUF for a time period that is considerably longer than the one required for the readout of a weak PUF. Ring-oscillator and SRAM PUFs are considered to be weak, whereas optical and arbiter PUFs (a type of delay-based silicon PUF) are considered to be strong [26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Quantum Key Distribution with Post-Processing Driven by Physical Unclonable Functions

Nikolopoulos,

Fischlin

2024

Applied Sciences

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Quantum key distribution protocols allow two honest distant parties to establish a common truly random secret key in the presence of powerful adversaries, provided that the two users share a short secret key beforehand. This pre-shared secret key is used mainly for authentication purposes in the post-processing of classical data that have been obtained during the quantum communication stage, and it prevents a man-in-the-middle attack. The necessity of a pre-shared key is usually considered to be the main drawback of quantum key distribution protocols, and it becomes even stronger for large networks involving more than two users. Here, we discuss the conditions under which physical unclonable functions can be integrated in currently available quantum key distribution systems in order to facilitate the generation and the distribution of the necessary pre-shared key with the smallest possible cost in the security of the systems. Moreover, the integration of physical unclonable functions in quantum key distribution networks allows for real-time authentication of the devices that are connected to the network.

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