Potential functions for finding stable coalition structures

Gusev, Vasily V.; Mazalov, Vladimir V.

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2019.08.006

Cited by 15 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…The existence of stable coalition structures in games with transferable utilities, when the Shapley vector or ES solution is considered as a solution, is studied in the papers [5][6]. The existence of stable coalition structures with respect to some cooperative solutions is considered in [9][10][11]. The paper [12] studies a coalition structure consisting of one large coalition and several singleton coalitions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Coalitional Differential Game of Vaccine Producers

Ndiaye,

Parilina

2024

ARC

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The paper proposes a game-theoretic model of competition and cooperation, including partial cooperation, of vaccine producers. Various versions of players’ cooperation (partial and full) have been studied. The differential game has an infinite duration. For each possible coalition of players, the profits and production quantities of its members are determined. An stability analysis of possible coalition structures, as well as coalitions that are most attractive to customers has been made.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Coalitional Differential Game of Vaccine Producers

Ndiaye,

Parilina

2024

ARC

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“…Our study considers the literature on fuzzy cooperative game strategies and benefitsharing problems, and some scholars have investigated this fuzzy phenomenon [6][7][8][9][10]. Zhou Xiaoyang et al addressed the equilibrium strategies of cross-regional supply chain networks under the influence of multitrade policies [11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Sustainable Cooperation Strategies for Cross-Regional Supply Chain Enterprises in Uncertain Environments

Li,

Wu,

Shao

2023

Sustainability

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Considering the fuzziness of cooperation and the sustainability of the redevelopment of cross-regional supply chain enterprises, the fuzzy participation degree and the generalized redistribution coefficient are introduced to describe the problem of cooperation and benefit distribution of cross-regional supply chain enterprises. A fuzzy average monotone game is constructed to study the strategies of cross-regional supply chain enterprises to increase the average benefit with the expansion of the alliance scale; a generalized fuzzy reduced game is discussed to ensure the partner selection decision of supply chain enterprises; the concepts of generalized fuzzy core, generalized fuzzy bargaining set, and generalized fuzzy proportional distribution are proposed; the equivalence between the generalized fuzzy core and the generalized fuzzy bargaining set of the fuzzy average monotone game of the cross-regional supply chain enterprises is proved; the nonempty generalized fuzzy core solution of the fuzzy average monotone game is characterized; and the example analysis shows the stability of the cross-regional supply chain enterprise alliance and the existence of the optimal generalized redistribution scheme. The research results not only satisfy the willingness of cross-regional supply chain enterprises to participate in cooperation with some resources from the “environmental” pillar of supply chain enterprise management sustainability but also achieve the strategy of retaining partial benefits for the redevelopment of supply chain alliances from the “economic” pillar of supply chain enterprise management sustainability, which provides a theoretical basis for the cooperation and benefit redistribution of cross-regional supply chain enterprises under uncertain environments.

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“…The existence of a stable coalition structure with respect to the Shapley value as well as the equal surplus division value in four-person games with special characteristic function is investigated in (Sun and Parilina, 2018). In (Gusev and Mazalov, 2019), the existence of a Nashstable coalition structure is proved for cooperative games with the Aumann-Dreve value using the framework of potential functions. In comparison with (Sedakov et al, 2013), the chance of players to block the deviation of a player is considered in the case when payoffs reduce with this deviation in (Sun et al, 2021).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Existence of Stable Coalition Structures in Three-player Games with Graph-constrained Solution

Sun¹

2022

Contributions to Game Theory and Management

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The stability of coalition structures is investigated in the sense that no player prefers to individually deviate from the current coalition considering his utility. This principle is close to the concept of the Nash equilibrium. The evaluation of each player's utility is determined with respect to the solution concept- the Shapley value with exogenous directed graph constraint. The existence of a stable coalition structure with respect to such a solution is examined for two-player as well as three-player games.

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Potential functions for finding stable coalition structures

Cited by 15 publications

References 19 publications

A Coalitional Differential Game of Vaccine Producers

A Coalitional Differential Game of Vaccine Producers

Research on Sustainable Cooperation Strategies for Cross-Regional Supply Chain Enterprises in Uncertain Environments

Existence of Stable Coalition Structures in Three-player Games with Graph-constrained Solution

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