2012
DOI: 10.1587/transfun.e95.a.1156
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Potential Game Based Distributed Control for Voronoi Coverage Problems with Obstacle Avoidance

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Cited by 6 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…This step guarantees that the decision achieving social welfare maximization is a so-called Nash equilibrium. However, it is known that there can exist a lot of equilibria and some of them can be inefficient in the sense of the social welfare maximization [6]- [10]. To avoid such undesirable equilibria, the game theoretic cooperative control designs the agents' action selection policy, called learning algorithms.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This step guarantees that the decision achieving social welfare maximization is a so-called Nash equilibrium. However, it is known that there can exist a lot of equilibria and some of them can be inefficient in the sense of the social welfare maximization [6]- [10]. To avoid such undesirable equilibria, the game theoretic cooperative control designs the agents' action selection policy, called learning algorithms.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The second goal of this paper is to solve the formulated problem in a distributed fashion. For this purpose, we employ game theoretic cooperative control techniques as in [9]- [13], since it provides a systematic design procedure to reach the total optima in a distributed fashion for heterogeneous networks like energy networks. In this paper, we first point out analogy of the formulated problem with resource allocation games [14].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%