Potential of the state to control privatized firms

Hanousek, Jan; Kočenda, Evžen

doi:10.1007/s10644-008-9047-3

Cited by 19 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…For more details on the privatization process see, e.g., Kočenda (1999); Hanousek and Kočenda (2008), and Estrin et al (2009), among others. 5 The privatization of each state-owned firm was decided on the basis of an officially accepted privatization project.…”

Section: The Institutional Setting and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Firm break-up and performance

Kočenda

Hanousek

2012

Econ Gov

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We analyze the effects of firm break-up on corporate performance. Our analysis is based on a unique data set for a large number of Czech firms spanning the period 1996-2000. We employ a propensity score matching procedure to deal with endogeneity problems. Our results, which are generally in line with the positive effects of firm break-up found in the developed-market literature, show that the initial effects of firm break-up are positive but after a certain point they disappear within a short time. Factors like changes in ownership structure or management are found to be behind later improvements in the performance of firms.

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Section: The Institutional Setting and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However,Hanousek and Kočenda (2008) andKočenda and Hanousek (2012) show that state control over privatized firms was considerable and persisted well beyond the completion of privatization.…”

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confidence: 99%

Firm break-up and performance

Kočenda

Hanousek

2012

Econ Gov

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“…However, this privatization method did not fulfi ll the expectations of its proponents. It failed to concentrate companies' ownership structure, minority shareholders' rights were harmed, foreign investors were not attracted (Kočenda and Valachy, 2002), capital necessary for companies' restructuring was not generated (Lieberman, 1997), and state remained in control of already privatized companies for excessively long period (Hanousek and Kočenda, 2008). Moreover, it incurred certain hidden costs that concern the evolution of necessary market institutions of the type that function in the developed market economies.…”

Section: Stock Market Development In the Czech Republicmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Firm Delisting on the Prague Stock Exchange

Fungáčová¹,

Hanousek²

2011

Prague Economic Papers

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Abstract:This research investigates the emergence of stock market in the Czech Republic. We use Czech mass privatization as an experiment that allows us to analyze under what conditions a viable stock market arises. On the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE), unlike its counterparts in Poland or Hungary, exceptionally large amounts of shares were delisted e.g. excluded from public trading soon after trading at this market began in 1993. We estimate the determinants of shares delisting analyzing the period 1993-2004. Using fi rm-level data on listed and delisted companies we show that it was possible to prevent massive delisting if certain pre-privatization and privatization characteristics of the companies had been taken into account when deciding which companies to place on the stock exchange for public trading following the mass privatization. This result has important implications for establishing stock markets in emerging economies.

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“…In the present paper we describe only the features essential to our analysis. For more details on the privatization process see e.g., Kočenda (1999), Hanousek and Kočenda (2008), and Estrin et al (2009), among others. 5 Shleifer and Treisman (2005) show that privatization was very successful from the political point of view almost from the outset.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…5 Shleifer and Treisman (2005) show that privatization was very successful from the political point of view almost from the outset. However, Hanousek and Kočenda (2008) and Kočenda and Hanousek (2009) show that state control over privatized firms was considerable and persisted well beyond the completion of privatization. 6 Privatization of each state-owned firm was decided on the basis of an officially accepted privatization project.…”

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confidence: 99%

Divide and Privatize: Firms Break-Up and Performance

Koécenda

Hanousek

2010

SSRN Journal

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Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

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Potential of the state to control privatized firms

Abstract: Privatization, State control potential, Golden share, Strategic firms, D2, G3, H8, L3, P4,

Cited by 19 publications

References 18 publications

Firm break-up and performance

Firm break-up and performance

Determinants of Firm Delisting on the Prague Stock Exchange

Divide and Privatize: Firms Break-Up and Performance

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