Potential strategies and biosafety protocols used for dual‐use research on highly pathogenic influenza viruses

Abstract

Summary Influenza A viruses (IAVs), particularly the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1, have posed a substantial threat to public health worldwide. Although the laboratory generation of the mutant influenza virus H5N1 with airborne transmissibility among mammals, which has been considered as a dual-use research, may benefit the development of effective vaccines and therapeutics against the emerging infectious agents, it may also pose threats to national biosecurity, laboratory biosafety, and/or public health. This review introduces the classification and characterization of IAVs, pinpoints historic pandemics and epidemics caused by IAVs, emphasizes the significance and necessity of biosafety, summarizes currently established biosafety-related protocols for IAV research, and provides potential strategies to improve biosafety protocols for dual-use research on the highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses and other emerging infectious agents.

Biosecurity and biosafety in research on emerging pathogens

“…7 Thus, researchers should be particularly careful in handling laboratory-generated organisms or mutant pathogens with increased transmissibility in humans since the regular protective procedures may not be effective for the new pathogens. 8 Following suggestions are made for the researchers who are working on these new pathogens: (i) they must be well trained and proficient in handling such dangerous materials safely; (ii) they should make a detailed risk assessment under the direction of the Institutional Biosafety Committees consisting of biological safety professionals before starting to work on the infectious agents, analyze the worst case scenarios that may occur and prepare a strategy to mitigate the impact of the negative event if it happens; (iii) they should strictly follow the safety procedures and manage the research materials by adherence to appropriate materials management procedures; (iv) they should report to their supervisors or biosafety officials immediately if they encounter a dangerous situation or identify a new pathogen with significantly increased human transmissibility and/or virulence; and (v) they must establish material accountability procedures to track the inventory, storage, use, transfer and destruction of dangerous biological materials and assets when no longer needed (http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5). …”