Power and developmental regimes in Singapore, China and Malaysia

Abstract

This paper examines three developmental regimes in Singapore, China and Malaysia. In these three cases, heavy state intervention was necessary because their economies required significant economic restructuring. For Singapore, state intervention was necessary for the process of industrial transformation. For Malaysia, state intervention was necessary because the government wanted to reallocate economic resources as a means to deal with ethnic conflict. For China, state intervention was necessary in order to gradually “marketize” the socialist economy. The paper also briefly discusses the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1999) on these developmental regimes. It finds that for all three cases, economic restructuring was successful because of long-term and heavy state intervention. It explains that, unlike the other developmental states of Asia, these developmental regimes were able to undertake such significant restructuring because of the state's power base, which even managed to survive the Asian Financial Crisis. It concludes with some comments about the future of state intervention in a rapidly globalizing world.Singapore, Malaysia, China, developmental regimes, interventionist states,

The Internationalisation of Mainland Chinese Firms into Malaysia: From Obligated Embeddedness to Active Embeddedness

“…Upon the unification of China in 1949, the China Communist Party (CCP) organised a series of import substituting industrialisation (ISI) programmes led by newly formed SOEs. Mao Zedong, chairman of the CCP, had wanted to build a socialist economic system (in the way he saw fit), but these efforts were not particularly successful because of the low level of capital and expertise, obsolete technology, poor management system, and lack of willing buyers for such products (Pereira and Tong 2005). The situation worsened in 1960 as the Soviet Union withdrew all its advisers and discontinued aid to China after irreconcilable political and ideological disagreements emerged between the leadership of both countries (Vu 2010).…”

“…Deng's reform centred largely on two interrelated pivots -attracting FDI and professionalising China's large cohort of SOEs. As Pereira and Tong (2005) explained, multinational firms were encouraged to invest in China, especially to form joint ventures with the SOEs, so that technological and managerial expertise could be transferred to the Chinese. Many of these SOEs were also gradually internationalised, and some have gone on to become global brand names.…”

The Regional Dimension of Education Hubs: Leading and Brokering Geopolitics

“…student begins studies in Malaysia then completes it overseas). The unmet demand was due partially to affirmative action policies that favoured the economically disadvantaged Malay majority since the 1970s (Pereira and Tong, 2005;Tham, 2011). Strict ethnic quotas at public universities marginalized large numbers of Chinese and Indian students, who then enrolled in private institutions or left the country entirely.…”

Socio-cultural determinants of Malaysia and Singapore innovative development

“…The so-called "Asian Tigers" -innovative countries in the East Asian regionowe their rapid development to consistent government reforms. Alexius A. Pereira and Chee Kiong Tong examine the content of the economic restructuring policies of the governments of Singapore, Malaysia, and China (Pereira & Tong, 2005). According to them, the specifics of state influence on the economy in Singapore were necessary for industrial transformation, in Malaysia economic programs should be assessed as a way to level the ethnic conflict, in China -as a way to commercialize the "socialist" economy.…”