Power and Global Economic Institutions

Kaya, Ayse

doi:10.1017/cbo9781316343258

Cited by 66 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 178 publications

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“…Delegates agreed to a quota system for the IMF and a system based on capital subscriptions for the World Bank that determined the relative contributions of member-states, how much a member could borrow, as well as the voting power and representation each member state had within the respective organization. While both legacy organizations were founded on norms of sovereign equality that were enshrined in 'basic votes' for all members, the inclusion of a second element in the form of a weighted formula gave large economies greater power (Kaya, 2015;Weaver & Moschella, 2017). This meant that the large industrialized nations had outsized influence in setting the priorities of the two organizations.…”

Section: Formal Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Because major reforms required approval from boards in which the US enjoyed a blocking minority, radical departures in the foundational practices or policy prescriptions do not happen without US consent. Moreover, as Kaya (2015) shows, this at-the-founding feature has provided opportunities for the US to exercise significant informal power over the ways in which the two organizations have adjusted formally to shifts in the underlying variables that are used to allocate voting weights (economic size, reserves, trade).…”

Section: Formal Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

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Legacies and innovations in global economic governance since Bretton Woods

Fioretos

Heldt

2019

Review of International Political Economy

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The international economic system that emerged after the 1944 Bretton Woods conference became the most durable international arrangement devoted to economic openness. Seventy-five years after the conference, however, global shifts in power, institutional gridlock, and populist backlash figure prominently in accounts predicting the system's demise. This article examines the legacies of the Bretton Woods conference for structures and practices of global economic governance and innovations that emerged over time to adapt the system to new political and economic circumstances. It explores how and why the Bretton Woods system became a more variegated system over time with respect to four features of governance: membership, legalization, organizational focality, and market embeddedness. It identifies sources and effects of expanding membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the emergence of new formal and informal institutions, the challenges of a more fragmented institutional landscape, and shifts in the underlying principles of economic governance. Finally, the article discusses lessons from past crises in and reforms to the Bretton Woods system, and their implications for understanding recent challenges to global economic cooperation.

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Section: Formal Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Formal Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Legacies and innovations in global economic governance since Bretton Woods

Fioretos

Heldt

2019

Review of International Political Economy

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“…Danahar, 1994). Large developing nations devoted political resources to gain greater voice within the IMF and World Bank (Kaya, 2015; Weaver and Moschella, 2017), as well as within new informal forums (Cooper and Pouliot, 2015). At the more ambitious end, proposals were put forward for the creation of an Economic Security Council in the United Nations.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rhetorical Appeals and Strategic Cooptation in the Rise and Fall of The New International Economic Order

Fioretos

2020

Global Policy

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The global governance institutions that structure economic relations between industrialized and developing countries have been contested since their inception. This contribution revisits elements of the struggle over the 'new international economic order', or NIEO, in the 1970s. Contemporaneous observers and political leaders saw the initiative as part of the first major shift in global power after 1945. Using strategies of rhetorical coercion and persuasion that aimed to radically reform global economic governance, a large coalition of developing nations proposed a reform agenda designed to expand the authority of the United Nations and reduce the importance of Bretton Woods institutions. In response, a small coalition of industrialized countries adopted strategies of cooptation that entailed 'case-by-case' cooperation with developing countries with the goal of limiting overall reforms. The contribution uses historical archives from deliberations within and among industrialized countries to reveal the sources behind their response to the NIEO and follow-up initiatives. It shows that industrialized countries chose to deemphasize strategies of argumentation in favor of strategies of cooptation in their efforts to limit transformative change in global economic governance. Policy Implications • Global economic governance has been historically contested, but fundamental reform has been elusive. The scope of reform has remained heavily constrained by institutional designs from the 1940s and efforts by large industrialized economies to limit reform. Contemporary balances of global power make it unlikely that past impasses will be overcome. • Supporters and opponents of fundamental change in global economic governance have used a variety of rhetorical and bargaining strategies to shape paths of institutional development. Industrialized economies have long favored cooptation strategies, while developing nations have shifted from strategies of rhetorical coercion to strategies of principled persuasion. Major shifts in these choices are unlikely given existing distributions of global power. • A necessary condition for fundamental reform to global economic governance is agreement among G7 members. While the role of the G7 is less apparent today in a context of more organizations and populist nationalism, the reliance on strategies of cooptation by G7 members have had long legacies that continue to give its members disproportionate power over global economic governance reform.

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“…The growing influence of emerging economies, including their impact on institutions of global governance, is well documented (Heldt and Mahrenbach, 2019; Hopewell, 2015; Kahler, 2013; Kaya, 2015; Lipscy, 2017; Stephen, 2017; Zangl et al, 2016). In the context of the climate regime, the rise of China, India, Brazil and other emerging powers had distinct and important effects on the interests of states and their negotiating positions, especially concerning the issue of differentiation.…”

Section: The Power Shift: Emerging Economies and The Politics Of Diffmentioning

confidence: 99%

Emerging Powers and Differentiation in Global Climate Institutions

Thompson

2020

Global Policy

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The Paris Agreement on climate change brought states from the North and South together under a common framework to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. This was a remarkable institutional adjustment for a regime that had always maintained a strict distinction between developed and developing countries and imposed meaningful obligations only on the former. To better understand this change, I look at the negotiations surrounding the issue of 'differentiation'. The rising emissions of the emerging economies created a demand for institutional change on the part of key industrialized countries; however, they faced resistance from the increasingly assertive BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China). The challengers ultimately adopted strategic cooptation as their main negotiation strategy, offering compromises in the areas of climate finance and the legal form of new commitments. The climate case sheds light on the impact of power shifts in the domain of global environmental governance and illustrates that calls for change sometime comes from established rather than rising powers. Policy Implications • The success of the global climate regime will depend on its ability to attract participation by a large number of heterogeneous states, from the developed and developing world alike. This implies that debates over 'common but differentiated responsibilities' will remain a central part of the negotiations.

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Power and Global Economic Institutions

Cited by 66 publications

References 178 publications

Legacies and innovations in global economic governance since Bretton Woods

Legacies and innovations in global economic governance since Bretton Woods

Rhetorical Appeals and Strategic Cooptation in the Rise and Fall of The New International Economic Order

Emerging Powers and Differentiation in Global Climate Institutions

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