Abstract-In each country today, cellular networks operate on carefully separated frequency bands. This careful separation is imposed by the regulators of the given country to avoid the interference between these networks. But, the separation is only valid for the network operators within the borders of their country, hence the operators are left on their own to resolve cross-border interference of their cellular networks. In this paper, we focus on the scenario of two operators, who want to fine-tune the emitting power of the pilot signals (i.e., beacon signals) of their base stations. This operation is crucial, because the pilot signal power determines the number of users they can attract and hence the revenue they can obtain. In the case of no power costs, we show that operators should be strategic in their borders, meaning to fine-tune the emitting power of their pilot signals. In addition, we study Nash equilibrium conditions in an empirical model and show the efficiency of the Nash equilibria for different user densities. Finally, we modify our game model to take power costs into account. In the model with power costs, the players should still be strategic, but their strategic behavior results in a well-known Prisoner's Dilemma and hence in a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium.