2004
DOI: 10.1525/ap3a.2004.14.053
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Power, Fairness, and Architecture: Modeling Early Chiefdom Development in the Central Andes

Abstract: This chapter models the development of complex architecture in simple chiefly societies in the Central Andes. We employ a theoretical framework that draws from evolutionary game theory, economic anthropology, evolutionary psychology, and comparative behavioral science. In this theoretical framework, the evolution of culture equates with the evolution of human cooperation in ever-larger groups. As "conditional cooperators," humans will create complex labor organizations under the appropriate conditions. Taking … Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…As argued by Stanish (2004;Stanish and Haley, 2005), ritual is one social mechanism by which equitable contribution by all community members is observed and measured, and through which free riders can be identified and subsequently censured by the group. In pre-modern societies, feasting was a ritualized activity that in part served to redistribute food within and between communities, but was also a public setting in which contributions of various factions could be monitored.…”
Section: Risk Poolingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As argued by Stanish (2004;Stanish and Haley, 2005), ritual is one social mechanism by which equitable contribution by all community members is observed and measured, and through which free riders can be identified and subsequently censured by the group. In pre-modern societies, feasting was a ritualized activity that in part served to redistribute food within and between communities, but was also a public setting in which contributions of various factions could be monitored.…”
Section: Risk Poolingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Any of these polities could collapse at any time leaving behind uncontrolled territory in which new settlements subsequently sprang up to begin another cycle. Although a multitude of circumstances could have set the stage, the proximate cause of fission was assumed to be competition over leadership between internal factions (Stanish 2005). It also seemed reasonable to expect that the larger a polity the greater the number of internal factions and hence the more likely resistance would occur.…”
Section: Fission/fusion Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The extent of coercion for this purpose certainly varied greatly and its importance is still hotly debated. However the assumption was that commoner farmers submitted to elite leadership in exchange for improved security and increased productivity due to economies of scale (Stanish and Haley 2005). This reciprocal exchange was modeled as an increase in carrying capacity of a polity's satellite settlements (K sat ) accompanied by a transfer of some portion of the enhanced K to the polity's center (K ctr ).…”
Section: Resource Allocationmentioning
confidence: 99%