Power-Sharing and the Paradox of Federalism: Federalization and the Evolution of Ethno-Territorial Conflict in the Case of Belgium (1979–2018)

Vandenberghe, Maxime

doi:10.1080/17449057.2022.2045828

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…Flemish nationalist leader De Wever regularly describes Belgium as the sum of two separate democracies and sees the country's split as inevitable. The Belgian case seems to support the ‘paradox of federalism’ (Erk & Anderson, 2010), according to which federalism reinforces demands for autonomy rather than pacifying tensions (Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2015; Vandenberghe, 2022). Belgium is perhaps the best example of this paradox, since its transformation from a unitary state into a federal state in 1993 did not represent the culmination of demands for regional autonomy.…”

Section: A Centripetal Consociationalism 1: a Federal Constituencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Centripetalism in Consociational Democracy: The Multiple Proportional Vote and the Belgian Case

de Briey,

de Briey

2024

Swiss Political Sci Review

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Belgium illustrates that using consociational institutions in divided societies may ensure a peaceful political environment, but it fails in reducing its centrifugal tendencies. As communitarian issues threaten to paralyse the political debate, preserving the efficiency of the state will require adding centripetal incentives to the consociational framework. However, the solution usually proposed for this purpose –the creation of a federal constituency– would be insufficient and would raise legitimacy problems analogous to those occurred in Bosnia, the Swiss Canton of Berne or Cyprus. Instead, this paper advocates the adoption of a new electoral system: the Multiple Proportional Vote (MPV). MPV can maintain the consociational goal of including the different communities in the parliament, as well as to strengthen the centripetal trends towards moderation. Indeed, electors of every group are allowed to cast their preferences for candidates of the other communities. As such, MPV suggests that consociationalism and its main theoretical alternative, centripetalism, are far from mutually exclusive.

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Section: A Centripetal Consociationalism 1: a Federal Constituencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Centripetalism in Consociational Democracy: The Multiple Proportional Vote and the Belgian Case

de Briey,

de Briey

2024

Swiss Political Sci Review

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“…However, ethnic outbidding is not inevitable (Vandenberghe, 2022). As Mitchell et al (2009) convincingly show in the case of Northern Ireland, it was the DUP and Sinn Féin's increased moderation combined with the perception that effectively representing their ethnic group's interests underpinned their electoral success (p. 403).…”

Section: Consociational Power‐sharing In Divided Societiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do birds of a feather flock together? Patterns of ethnolinguistic group representation in the Brussels Capital Region

Blanckaert

Caluwaerts

2023

Swiss Political Sci Review

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Consociational democracy is commonly discussed through the assumed premise of co‐ethnic group representation whereby representatives are institutionally incentivized to represent co‐ethnic interests. However, little attention has been paid to the process of group representation in consociations, in particular the link between descriptive and substantive ethnic group representation. This article considers representative claim‐making on behalf of ethnolinguistic groups in the Brussels Capital Region (Belgium), which is politically divided into Dutch and French speakers. Brussels constitutes an interesting case, because while we would expect co‐ethnic claim‐making to be the norm, Brussels MPs also receive electoral incentives to make representative claims on behalf of the other ethnolinguistic group (i.e., cross‐ethnic claim‐making). Based on a quantitative analysis of representative claims in parliamentary documents (2009–2019) from the Brussels Parliament, we find that cross‐ethnic claim‐making remains limited compared to co‐ethnic claim‐making, and that Dutch speakers and ethnic outbidders are more likely to speak on behalf of co‐ethnics.

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A three-legged race: assessing the functionality of consociational power-sharing with cabinet conflict-resolution data from Belgium (1979–2006)

Vandenberghe

2024

Acta Polit

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Power-Sharing and the Paradox of Federalism: Federalization and the Evolution of Ethno-Territorial Conflict in the Case of Belgium (1979–2018)

Cited by 5 publications

References 52 publications

Centripetalism in Consociational Democracy: The Multiple Proportional Vote and the Belgian Case

Centripetalism in Consociational Democracy: The Multiple Proportional Vote and the Belgian Case

Do birds of a feather flock together? Patterns of ethnolinguistic group representation in the Brussels Capital Region

A three-legged race: assessing the functionality of consociational power-sharing with cabinet conflict-resolution data from Belgium (1979–2006)

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