How do states maintain economic development in the face of sanctions? Recent studies have examined economic resilience as a property of a system preceding a shock, leaving unanswered questions about how sanctioned states discipline employers and limit predatory behaviour. Using the case of Iran, this article aims to fill this gap by presenting a model of mobilized resilience, describing how bottom‐up and top‐down mobilizations can create demand for institutional capacity. Integrating unique qualitative and quantitative material, the author argues that Iran's political elites responded to sanctions by launching top‐down campaigns that appealed to workers, promoted capital–labour unity, and demanded state commitment to development. These campaigns facilitated widespread labour protests that further empowered the state to block capital flight and steer firms onto more profitable, growth‐oriented routes. Labour ‘resistance’ thus unexpectedly helped to realize the Supreme Leader's calls for a ‘resistance economy’. These findings suggest that political support for worker mobilization in the context of sanctions can result in economic benefits, with significant consequences for our understanding of economic statecraft, development and labour movements.