Power Worlds and the Problem of Individuation

Abstract

Is it metaphysically possible for a world to contain power properties but no nonpower properties? Recently, much progress has been made by powers theorists to defend the coherence of such a possibility. But unfortunately, it remains unclear how the powers in a power world are individuated. The problem is that the most obvious principle of individuation for properties in a power world is one that is circular. In this paper, it is argued that this circularity is generated by a modal assumption, which is that different families of powers exist in different possible worlds. By rejecting this assumption, a noncircular principle of individuation for power properties can be formulated. Moreover, this solution is not ad hoc because there are independent reasons for rejecting the aforementioned modal assumption.

Individuating Powers: On the Regress/Circularity Individuation Arguments against Bird’s Dispositional Monism

“…Structuralist DM, so understood, constitutes a perfect example of how reasoning around metaphysical individuation is poorly served by Lowe's notion of individuation as a binary relation between objects, viz., in this case supposedly obtaining between the power and a reified structure, or position thereof. Now, to be sure, Structuralist DM is not per se a flawless position; as many have noted (Lowe 2010: 21;Oderberg 2011), it is forced to the position that all actual and possible power-structures must be asymmetric, which may be problematic in a few ways, and may require sophisticated metaphysical tools to be resolved (e.g., again, the Platonism in Tugby 2017). Yet, once the asymmetry is conceded, the individuation of powers through power-structures is not by itself problematic.…”

“…A different, two-step solution can be borrowed from Tugby (2017). First, we argue that there are no two non-overlapping power structures in the same world, viz., there are no dispositionally and causally isolated regions of the world.…”

“…(2017: 274) Again: two people taking each other's washing. Tugby (2017) also suggests a more indirect circularity in Structuralist DM: an account of the individuation of powers must also provide individuation conditions of the power being individuated; a theory of individuation should not be circular in the sense that "the entity being individuated should not appear (either explicitly or implicitly) in its own individuation conditions" (Tugby 2017: 273). When that happens, we have what I will call an Indirect Circularity.…”

Complex Events

“…With stative events, property and event-kind (humility and being humble) weren't easy to confuse, but with such processes as drinking the distinction between property (or relation), on the one hand, and event-kind, on the other, IS easy to confuse. For one word-e.g., "drinking"-can often be used for both.^Ĉ ausal Contexts Are Extensional Beardsley (1975) rejects the extensionality of causal contexts and adopts a "modification set criterion of event identity" (pp. 266, 272).…”