Powers, Processes, and Time

Abstract

In this paper I argue that even the most radical metaphysics of powers (such as that adopted by Mumford & Anjum, Cartwright, or Groff) are compatible with eternalism. I first offer a taxonomy of powers ontologies, and attempt to characterise the difference between moderate and radical powers ontologies-the latter are characterised by an emphasis on production and dynamicity. I consider an argument by C. Friebe to the effect that the productive character of powers is inconsistent with Eternalism and find it wanting. I then elucidate the notion of dynamicity that radical powers theorists employ by making apparent their link with an ontology of irreducible processes. Finally, I respond to an argument by Donatella Donati to the effect that eternalism entails a reductive account of change which is inconsistent with process ontologies, and show that the the two are compatible. I conclude that we have no reason to think that radical powers metaphysics (and, a fortiori, every powers ontology) are not compatible with eternalism. A broadly Neo-Humean conception of the world, paradigmatically embodied by Lewis' claim that 'all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another' (Lewis 1986: ix) has been, at least implicitly, the background world-view of most metaphysical theorising in the last decades of the twentieth century. Recently, however, this paradigm is being put 'under serious pressure within analytic metaphysics' (Groff & Greco, 2013: 1) by a rival, broadly Neo-Aristotelian picture of reality, spearheaded by the idea that there are real causal powers that establish necessary connections between existents. i

Can Causal Powers Cause Their Effects?

“…Once the cake is baked, it is no longer possible to distinguish either the components or the powers: they gradually change into the effect in a continuous, unbreakable way. As Giannini (2021) recently noticed, the assumption of irreducibility is close to what the continuant theorists of processes call homogeneity (Mourelatos 1978;Steward 2013Steward , 2015Stout 1997Stout , 2016):…”

Libertarian Freedom in an Eternalist World?

“…tbc); Koons (this volume, pp. tbc); Giannini (2021), and with that in hand I suspect they will be able to translate this work into the free will discussion. 34 For now, I'm fairly confident this objection can be overcome.…”

Dispositions and Powers

“…There is reason to believe that real activity is inconsistent with eternalism (understood as the view that all times, past, present, and future, exist and are equally real) because the latter looks quite static. But we do not think that the powers metaphysic should have such direct implications for the metaphysics of time (for discussion, see, e.g., Backmann 2018;Friebe 2018;Donati 2018;Giannini 2022 the latter argues that powers characterised in terms of real activity or dynamicity are in fact compatible with eternalism). What's more, it has been argued (Kimpton- Nye 2018Nye , 2021Leech 2017) that in order to be extensionally adequate a powers-based account of modality (e.g., Borghini and Williams 2008;Jacobs 2010;Vetter 2015) ought to be twinned with eternalism.…”