Practical Perception and Intelligent Action

Abstract

Perceiving things to be a certain way may in some cases lead directly to action that is intelligent (e.g., skillful, wise, clever, astute). This phenomenon has not often been discussed, though it is of broad philosophical interest. It also raises a difficult question: how can perception produce intelligent action? After clarifying the question-which I call the question of "practical perception"-and explaining what is required for an adequate answer, I critically examine two candidate answers drawn from work on related topics: the first, inspired by Hubert Dreyfus's phenomenological analysis of absorbed coping (and of a piece with James Gibson's theory of affordances), focuses on awareness of situational features; the other, suggested by Gilbert Ryle's classic treatment of knowledge-how, focuses on possession of behavioral dispositions. I argue that neither approach is adequate. Subsequently, I develop and defend an alternative answer that emphasizes the agent's conceptual understanding.

Improving identity leadership through a novel targeted reflective practice intervention

“…This act could be suggested to incur an organic behavioural change, merely through increased awareness of different or possibly more favourable leadership behaviours. A new knowledge base may alter the individual's understanding of identity leadership and perception of their own leadership, leading to new and recognisable 'intelligent action' (Bengson, 2016). For example, in the current study we found the largest differences between experimental and control group in impresarioship.…”

From metasemantics to analyticity

“…11 Cf. e.g.,(Peacocke, 1992, 29-33),(Bealer, 1998),(Bengson, 2016),(Balcerak Jackson & Balcerak Jackson, 2012); a similar argument is made in(Rattan & Wikforss, 2017). 12 Cf.…”