Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives

Legrand, Dorothée

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.04.002

Cited by 135 publications

(146 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…For instance, Gallagher [6] proposed the concept of the 'minimal self' which is defined as 'a consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience' and includes aspects such as sense of body ownership and agency. Similarly, 'pre-reflective (bodily) self-consciousness' means 'the most primitive form of self-consciousness corresponds to the subjective dimension of experience' [5]. Recently, Blanke & Metzinger [12] proposed a similar concept called 'minimal phenomenal selfhood' whose central defining features are global body ownership, self-location and first-person perspective.…”

Section: Definition and Properties Of The Subjective Frame (A) Introdmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Can we be more specific about the type of brainbody interactions involved? Sensory-motor integration has been proposed to underlie the sense of agency/body ownership [6] or more generally self-specifying processes [5] as well as perceptual consciousness [31]. We discarded neural subjective frame perceptual consciousness self-consciousness emotional feelings Figure 1.…”

Section: Definition and Properties Of The Subjective Frame (A) Introdmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The neural subjective frame: from bodily signals to perceptual consciousness

Park

Tallon‐Baudry

2014

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

194

138

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The report ‘I saw the stimulus’ operationally defines visual consciousness, but where does the ‘I’ come from? To account for the subjective dimension of perceptual experience, we introduce the concept of the neural subjective frame. The neural subjective frame would be based on the constantly updated neural maps of the internal state of the body and constitute a neural referential from which first person experience can be created. We propose to root the neural subjective frame in the neural representation of visceral information which is transmitted through multiple anatomical pathways to a number of target sites, including posterior insula, ventral anterior cingulate cortex, amygdala and somatosensory cortex. We review existing experimental evidence showing that the processing of external stimuli can interact with visceral function. The neural subjective frame is a low-level building block of subjective experience which is not explicitly experienced by itself which is necessary but not sufficient for perceptual experience. It could also underlie other types of subjective experiences such as self-consciousness and emotional feelings. Because the neural subjective frame is tightly linked to homeostatic regulations involved in vigilance, it could also make a link between state and content consciousness.

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Section: Definition and Properties Of The Subjective Frame (A) Introdmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Definition and Properties Of The Subjective Frame (A) Introdmentioning

confidence: 99%

The neural subjective frame: from bodily signals to perceptual consciousness

Park

Tallon‐Baudry

2014

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

194

138

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“…To illustrate the basic principles of self-specifying processes, we describe two paradigmatic examples -sensorimotor integration and homeostatic regulation -that underlie the self-experience of being a bodily agent. We then argue that although externally directed attention-demanding tasks can compromise self-related processing [7][8][9][10][17][18][19], such tasks can be expected to enhance another fundamental type of self-experience, namely that of being a cognitive-affective agent [6,15,16]. In support of this point, and to show how cognitive neuroscience can begin to model this type of self-experience, we apply the concept of selfspecifying processes to cognitive control, including emotion regulation.…”

Section: Glossarymentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Although the basic sensorimotor integration processes do not involve any representation of the self per se, they are nonetheless self-specifying [6] because they implement a unique egocentric perspective in perception and action, and thus implicitly specify the self as subject and agent of that perspective. According to this view, self-experience is present whenever a self-specific perspective exists, regardless of the properties of the represented content [6,15,16,21].…”

Section: Homeostatic Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To invoke James' [14] classic distinction, this paradigm targets the 'Me' -the self as known through its physical and mental attributes -and not the 'I' -the self as subjective knower and agent. Thus, relying exclusively on this paradigm would limit the cognitive neuroscience of self-experience to self-related processing (the 'Me'), to the neglect of the self-experience of being a knower and agent (the 'I') [6,15].…”

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confidence: 99%

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Specifying the Self for Cognitive Neuroscience

Christoff¹,

Cosmelli²,

Legrand³

et al. 2017

Preprint

Self Cite

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Cognitive neuroscience investigations of self-experience have mainly focused on the mental attribution of features to the self (self-related processing). In this paper, we highlight another fundamental, yet neglected, aspect of self-experience, that of being an agent. We propose that this aspect of self-experience depends on self-specifying processes, ones that implicitly specify the self by implementing a functional self/non-self distinction in perception, action, cognition and emotion. We describe two paradigmatic cases -sensorimotor integration and homeostatic regulation -and use the principles from these cases to show how cognitive control, including emotion regulation, is also self-specifying. We argue that externally directed, attention-demanding tasks, rather than suppressing self-experience, give rise to the selfexperience of being a cognitive-affective agent. We conclude with directions for experimental work based on our framework.Investigating self-experience in cognitive neuroscience How does the embodied brain give rise to self-experience? This question, long addressed by neurology [1] and neurophysiology [2], now attracts strong interest from cognitive neuroscience and the neuroimaging community [3][4][5][6].Recent neuroimaging studies have investigated selfexperience mainly by employing paradigms that contrast self-related with non-self-related stimuli and tasks. Such paradigms aim to reveal the cerebral correlates of 'selfrelated processing' (see Glossary). Recent reviews identify several brain regions that appear most consistently activated in self-related paradigms such as assessing one's personality, physical appearance or feelings; recognizing one's face; or detecting one's first name (see [4,6] for extensive reviews). The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex (Precuneus/ PCC) are the most frequently discussed [4-10], but two additional regions, the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and temporal pole, are also consistently activated [6].Although these studies have contributed valuable information about the neural correlates of self-related processing, two issues have recently arisen [3,6]. First, the identified regions, especially the midline regions (mPFC, Precuneus/PCC) often associated with self-related processing [4,[7][8][9][10], might not be self-specific, because they are also recruited for a wide range of other cognitive processes -recall of information from memory, inferential reasoning, and representing others' mental states [3,5,6]. In addition, the PCC appears to be engaged in attentional processes and might be a hub for attention and motivation [11,12], whereas the TPJ is important for attentional reorienting [13]. Hence, describing these regions (singly or collectively) as self-specific could be unwarranted [3,5,6]. Second, studies employing self-related processing approach self-experience through the self-attribution of mental and physical features, and thereby focus on the self as an object of attribution and not the self as the knowing subje...

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The Co‐Emergence of the Self and Autobiographical Memory: An Adaptive View of Early Memory

Howe

2013

The Wiley Handbook on the Development of Children's Memory

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Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives

Cited by 135 publications

References 29 publications

The neural subjective frame: from bodily signals to perceptual consciousness

The neural subjective frame: from bodily signals to perceptual consciousness

Specifying the Self for Cognitive Neuroscience

The Co‐Emergence of the Self and Autobiographical Memory: An Adaptive View of Early Memory

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