1998
DOI: 10.1037/h0091168
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Pre-unified separatism and rapprochement between behaviorism and cognitive psychology: The case of the reinforcer.

Abstract: Psychology is in a preparadigmatic or pre-unified stage of scientific development. Two characteristics of psychology's status are: (1) lack of cumulative scientific growth and (2) experimental-theoretical over-generalization. The reinforcer, as a construct in theories and as a critical element of behavioral change, has been a casualty of the separatism between such factions as radical behaviorism and cognitive psychology. In the end, psychology as a progressive science has been impeded, and psychological pract… Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…285-303;Slife, 1987Slife, , 1995Watkins, 1990;Williams, 1987), they do not provide an accurate or realistic paradigm for understanding human mentation (Neisser, 1976;Searle, 1980), they have provided only questionable accounts of nonverbal cognitive phenomena such as imagery (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991, pp. 45-47) and emotion (Taylor, 1985), and they are either based on an underlying philosophy that amounts to a mere variation of behaviorism (see arguments by Hishinuma, 1998;Leahey, 1992b;Rychlak, 1996;Williams, 1987) or are based on a reductionistic philosophy that claims nervous system activity is the fundamental reality of psychological processes (Bechtel, 1988;Churchland, 1995;Notterman, 2000). For these reasons, we suggest that neither connectionism nor more traditional cognitivism provides a suitable ontology for the discipline.…”
Section: A Framework For Ontologymentioning
confidence: 90%
“…285-303;Slife, 1987Slife, , 1995Watkins, 1990;Williams, 1987), they do not provide an accurate or realistic paradigm for understanding human mentation (Neisser, 1976;Searle, 1980), they have provided only questionable accounts of nonverbal cognitive phenomena such as imagery (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991, pp. 45-47) and emotion (Taylor, 1985), and they are either based on an underlying philosophy that amounts to a mere variation of behaviorism (see arguments by Hishinuma, 1998;Leahey, 1992b;Rychlak, 1996;Williams, 1987) or are based on a reductionistic philosophy that claims nervous system activity is the fundamental reality of psychological processes (Bechtel, 1988;Churchland, 1995;Notterman, 2000). For these reasons, we suggest that neither connectionism nor more traditional cognitivism provides a suitable ontology for the discipline.…”
Section: A Framework For Ontologymentioning
confidence: 90%