In the last …fteen years, numerous studies of multi-member courts have documented a phenomenon popularly known as "panel e¤ects."Two provocative …ndings from this literature are: (1) the inclusion of (nonpivotal) members from outside the dominant ideology on the panel predicts higher reversal rates of administrative agencies that are "like minded" with the panel's median voter; and (2) when mixed panels do not reverse, they frequently issue unanimous decisions. The apparently moderating effects of mixed panels both pose a challenge to conventional median voter theories and call into question the predictability and legitimacy of judicial review. Accordingly, many scholars have o¤ered their own explanation for panel e¤ects (including collegiality, dissent aversion, deliberation e¤ects, whistle-blowing, and others). In this paper, we propose a general model that (among other things) predicts panel e¤ects as a byproduct of strategic information acquisition. The kernel of our argument is that ideologically extreme, non-pivotal members of deliberative panels have incentives to engage in costly information production in cases where pivotal members would rationally choose not to do so. As a result, diverse panel compositions can catalyze distinct forms of information production producing equilibrium panel e¤ects. Our informational account -if correct -has normative implications for the composition of judicial panels in particular and for deliberative groups more generally.