Précis of memory: a philosophical study

Bernecker, Sven

doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9639-4

Cited by 27 publications

(49 citation statements)

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“…Unfortunately, as most theorists and practitioners have discovered, none of these criteria stand the test of logical analysis or introspection (for reviews, see Bernecker, 2010;Casey, 1977;Furlong, 1951;Warnock, 1987). For example, Russell's assumption that the content of memory experience is "bound to the past" is undermined by demonstrations that memorial experience is, at least to a degree, reconstructive (e.g., Bartlett, 1932).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…And, we all have had experiences in which an imagination is vivid and a memory faint. As Bernecker (2010) concludes, the problem with the memory-markers thus far proposed is that "they don't offer a reliable mark" (p. 22). However, this need not concern us if memory is construed as a functionally related, interacting set of cognitive abilities rather than a fixed inscription in neural matter (e.g., De Brigard, 2013;Klein et al, 2004;Schacter, 2012).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Today, most psychologists (e.g., Squire, 2004;Tulving, 1985Tulving, , 2002Willingham & Goedert, 2001) and philosophers (e.g., Bernecker, 2010;Locke, 1971;Michaelian, 2010) view memory as collection of phenomenologically, conceptually, empirically and neurologically separable, but taxonomically related, abilities and dispositions. Among psychologists, this "systems" approach traditionally is seen to originate with Tulving's (1972) division of memory into episodic and semantic components, a classificatory scheme he subsequently expanded to include a procedural component as well (for reviews, Tulving, 1983Tulving, , 1985see also Squire, 1987).…”

Section: To Answer the Question "What Is Memory?" One Must First Apprmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The temporal orientation of memory: It's time for a change of direction.

Klein¹

2013

Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition

144

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a b s t r a c tCommon wisdom, philosophical analysis and psychological research share the view that memory is subjectively positioned toward the past: specifically, memory enables one to become re-acquainted with the objects and events of his or her past. In this paper I call this assumption into question. As I hope to show, memory has been designed by natural selection not to relive the past, but rather to anticipate and plan for future contingencies -a decidedly future-oriented mode of subjective temporality. This is not to say memory makes no reference to the past. But, I argue, past-oriented subjectivity is a by-product of a system designed by natural selection to help us face and respond to the "now and the next". I discuss the implications of the proposed temporal realignment for research agendas as well as the potential limitations of measures designed to explore memory by focusing on its retentive capabilities.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: To Answer the Question "What Is Memory?" One Must First Apprmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The temporal orientation of memory: It's time for a change of direction.

Klein¹

2013

Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition

144

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“…The question with which I am concerned here should be distinguished from the question, discussed by Martin and Deutscher (1996) and, more recently, by Bernecker (2010), whether true prompting is compatible with memory. There are two differences here: first, incorporation is not the same phenomenon as prompting; second, the two questions belong to different domains.…”

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confidence: 87%

The information effect: constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck

Michaelian

2011

Synthese

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The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent's memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research has focussed primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorporation of accurate information raises a particularly interesting epistemological question: do the resulting memory beliefs qualify as knowledge? It is intuitively plausible that they do not, for they appear to be only luckily true. I argue, however, that, despite its intuitive plausibility, this view is mistaken: once we adopt an adequate (modal) conception of epistemic luck and an adequate (adaptive) general approach to memory, it becomes clear that memory beliefs resulting from the incorporation of accurate testimonial information are not in general luckily true. I conclude by sketching some implications of this argument for the psychology of memory, suggesting that the misinformation effect would better be investigated in the context of a broader "information effect".The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent's memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research has focussed primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorporation of accurate

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“…(Clark and Chalmers are explicit on the point that what is stored in Otto's notebook are dispositional beliefs.) This picture of remembering as a purely preservative process is common among philosophers, though there are exceptions (e.g., Matthen, 2010); Burge (1993), e.g., discusses a purely preservative form of memory, and, while Bernecker's version of the causal theory of memory (Bernecker, 2008(Bernecker, , 2010 allows that certain transformations of content are compatible with remembering, it acknowledges only very limited transformations, forbidding transformations which add new content.…”

Section: Problems For Clark and Chalmers' Criteriamentioning

confidence: 99%

Is external memory memory? Biological memory and extended mind

Michaelian

2012

Consciousness and Cognition

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a b s t r a c t Clark and Chalmers (1998) claim that an external resource satisfying the following criteria counts as a memory: (1) the agent has constant access to the resource; (2) the information in the resource is directly available; (3) retrieved information is automatically endorsed; (4) information is stored as a consequence of past endorsement. Research on forgetting and metamemory shows that most of these criteria are not satisfied by biological memory, so they are inadequate. More psychologically realistic criteria generate a similar classification of standard putative external memories, but the criteria still do not capture the function of memory. An adequate account of memory function, compatible with its evolution and its roles in prospection and imagination, suggests that external memory performs a function not performed by biological memory systems. External memory is thus not memory. This has implications for: extended mind theorizing, ecological validity of memory research, the causal theory of memory.

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Précis of memory: a philosophical study

Cited by 27 publications

References 0 publications

The temporal orientation of memory: It's time for a change of direction.

The temporal orientation of memory: It's time for a change of direction.

The information effect: constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck

Is external memory memory? Biological memory and extended mind

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