Precursor processes of human self-initiated action

Khalighinejad, Nima; Schurger, Aaron; Desantis, Andrea; Zmigrod, Leor; Haggard, Patrick

doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.09.057

Cited by 69 publications

(105 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…However, the question still remains as to whether differences exist between the meaning associated with generation and termination. One possible difference may be related to agency, as many previous studies have implied (e.g., agency only in generation, (Khalighinejad, Schurger, Desantis, Zmigrod, & Haggard, 2018;Mifsud & Whitford, 2017)).…”

Section: Action For Generation/terminationmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…The latter is defined as the feeling of agency for terminating an action and the time perception of the terminated event by the individual's action. We hypothesized that onset agency is more evident than offset agency if self-agency is rooted in generation (Gallagher, 2000;Haggard, 2017;Jeannerod, 2003;Khalighinejad et al, 2018;Legrand, 2007;Mifsud & Whitford, 2017). Conversely, termination implies the action of others prior to termination,…”

Section: Onset/offset Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

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The self as a generative, teleological, and subjective prior: Mutually-modulated temporal agency

Asai

Imaizumi

Imamizu

2019

Preprint

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How can we certify our existence? Recent theoretical studies have suggested that, in the brain, the effect inversely infers the possibility of the existence of the self as the cause. While this Bayesian view of the sense of agency is widely accepted, empirical evidence in support of this theory is still lacking. The current study examined outcome-modulated agency in terms of time perception in seven experiments, with a total of 90 participants. It was hypothesized that perceptual generation, not termination, should subjectively infer the existence of the self, even though both include the same stimuli and are driven by the same teleological action.Results suggest support for the hypothesis (Experiments 1 and 2). Participants judged stronger self-agency, detected less delay, or felt shorter duration for auditory generation, compared with termination, which was driven by the same volitional key-press. Furthermore, the main experiment, Experiment 3, focused on temporal probability distributions both for action and outcome (e.g., standard deviations or relative entropy), and concluded that the observed contrast in onset/offset agency indicates a mutual or bidirectional relationship between cause and effect only during agentive action, characterized by active (i.e., teleological) generation.Finally, the concurrent theoretical models for volitional action-modulated time perception are discussed on the basis of the suggested triplet (generativity, teleology, and subjectivity) dimensions of agency. Extended abstractThe sense of agency refers to the subjective experience of generating one's own actions (Gallagher, 2000).Within the past decade, research on this subject has increased, as increased understanding of human agency could be a window into knowing how we are aware of ourselves, and possibly allowing for a better understanding of mental illnesses, like schizophrenia. However, "free will," "self-consciousness," and/or "volition" are concepts that are always difficult to empirically investigate (Frith & Haggard, 2018).Researchers do not know exactly what occurs in our sensorium during "agentive action." However, three conceptions could represent genuine dimensions of agency: generativity, teleology, and subjectivity (Haggard, 2019).Recent theoretical studies have suggested that, in the brain, the effect inversely infers the possibility of the existence of the self as the cause. This Bayesian view of the sense of agency may provide an explanation for classical statements, such as "ego cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am)," "cogito cogito, ergo cogito sum (I think that I think, therefore I think that I am)," "I move, therefore I am," or "I predict, therefore I am." (e.g., Corlett, 2017). All of these theoretical claims implicitly refer to the Bayesian "inverse" probability or inference (e.g., "thought as action"), where the effect (perception) retrospectively postdicts the cause (action), as well as the action predicting the following perception (Figure 1, including generativity, teleology, and subjectivity as ...

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Section: Action For Generation/terminationmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Onset/offset Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

The self as a generative, teleological, and subjective prior: Mutually-modulated temporal agency

Asai

Imaizumi

Imamizu

2019

Preprint

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“…All procedures were approved by the UCL ICN ethics committee. This sample size was selected to match previous RP studies (Khalighinejad, Brann, Dorgham, & Haggard, 2019;Khalighinejad et al, 2018).…”

Section: Participantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This approach differs from many previous voluntary action studies, where participants are merely asked to make an action at a time they themselves choose (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965;Libet, 1985; but see Khalighinejad, Schurger, Desantis, Zmigrod, & Haggard, 2018). By embedding self-initiated actions in an economic decision-making paradigm, we provide a bridge between the study of voluntary action and that of decision-making and action more broadly.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Readiness Potential reflects the internal source of action, rather than decision uncertainty

Travers

Haggard

2019

Preprint

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Voluntary actions are preceded by the Readiness Potential (RP), a slow EEG component generated in supplementary motor area. The RP is usually thought to be specific to internally-driven decisions to act, and reflect post-decision motor preparation. Recent work suggests instead that it may reflect noise or conflict during the decision itself, with internally-driven decisions tending to be more random, more conflictual and thus more uncertain than externally-driven actions. To contrast accounts based on endogenicity with accounts based on uncertainty, we recorded EEG in a task where participants decided to act or withhold action to accept or reject gambles. We found no difference in an RP-related motor component when comparing actions driven by strong versus weak evidence, indicating that the RP does not reflect uncertainty. In contrast, the same RP-related component showed higher amplitudes actions performed without external evidence (guesses) than for those performed in response to equivocal, conflicting evidence. This supports the view that the RP reflects the internal generation of action, rather than decision uncertainty.

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“…showing that voluntary intentions are associated with noise reduction in motor-related neural activity (Khalighinejad, Schurger, Desantis, Zmigrod, & Haggard, 2018). Additionally, the implementation of hierarchy through noise regulation was inspired by Hierarchical Gaussian Filters, where the degree of noise (or 'volatility') of a hierarchically-lower variable can change over time, depending on the current state of a hierarchically-higher variable (Mathys, Daunizeau, Friston, & Stephan, 2011;Mathys et al, 2014).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Two Ways to Change Your Mind: Effects of Intentional Strength and Motor Costs on Changes of Intention

Löffler

Sylaidi²,

Fountas

et al. 2019

Preprint

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Changes of Mind are a striking example of the human ability to flexibly reverse decisions after commitment to an initial choice, and to change actions according to circumstances. Previous studies of Changes of Mind largely focused on perceptual choices. Here we investigate reversals of voluntary, endogenous action decisions. In a novel version of the random-dot motion task, participants moved to a target that matched both the perceived dot-motion direction and an internally-generated intention (which colour target to move to). Movement trajectories revealed whether and when participants 1) perceived a change in dot-motion direction, or additionally 2) changed the colour that they chose to move to ('Change of Intention'). Changes of Intention were less frequent in participants with strong colour intentions, as indicated by high performance costs in trials where perceptual information conflicted with the endogenous intention (Exp. 1). Additionally, Changes of Intention were more frequent when motor costs of intention pursuit were high (Exp. 2). These findings were simulated using an attractor network model that continuously integrates voluntary intentions, sensory evidence, and motor costs. This argues in favour of a unifying framework for dynamic decision-making processes, in which voluntary actions emerge from a dynamic combination of internal action tendencies and external environmental factors.

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Precursor processes of human self-initiated action

Cited by 69 publications

References 57 publications

The self as a generative, teleological, and subjective prior: Mutually-modulated temporal agency

The self as a generative, teleological, and subjective prior: Mutually-modulated temporal agency

The Readiness Potential reflects the internal source of action, rather than decision uncertainty

Two Ways to Change Your Mind: Effects of Intentional Strength and Motor Costs on Changes of Intention

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