Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents, 1986: A status report: Main report and Appendixes A,B, and C

Precursors to potential severe core damage accidents: 1994, a status report. Volume 22: Appendix I

“…Rpt. 213/94-03 8 to functional recovery procedure FR-H.l. This procedure discusses the use of the PORVs as a method for core cooling.…”

“…Thus, while some similarities exist between these events, we have concluded the underlying casual factors of these events are different. FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE ( On May 21, 1994, at 1442 hours, the dispatcher notified the BNP Control Room that they were commencing the switching evolution to return the Whiteville 230 kV line to service. At 1505 hours, the dispatcher confirmed with the BNP Unit 2 Control Room that the SAT was being supplied from Switchyard Bus 2B.…”

“…The information gained from these inspections was evaluated and resulted in ruling out many theorized causes. (2) 05000-458 LER NUMBER (6) 94-023-01 PAGEP)…”

“…the condensate system was restored, to serv.ice_and at approximately 11:21 p.m.', the feedwater system was restofed" to 5 service. The MSIVs were .then opened, and the operators verified.…”

“…A systematic walkdown of accessible piping was again performed and no damage to system piping or components was found. FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (6) PAGE ( The failure of RHR-MOV-M016B to fully close was caused by foreign particles on one of the two torque switch contacts. When the control switch for the valve was taken to CLOSED, the limit switch (LS8) bypassed the torque switch and allowed the motor operator to operate up to 97% fully closed position.…”