Predication and the Frege–Geach problem

Propositions as Structured Cognitive Event‐Types

“…Soames treats the four verb phrases in (4) as equivalent, expressing the same neutral cognitive act‐type. Hanks (2015: 36‐9) and Reiland (2019a: 144‐5, 149; 2019b: 223) object that “nothing neutral can explain representation” and thus have truth conditions. But if we are merely supposing or hypothesizing that George has pneumonia, and thus thinking of George as having pneumonia, we are representing George as having pneumonia even though we do not affirm that he has it.…”

Force, content and the varieties of subject

“…That would be unobjectionable, but wouldn't have the implication that a distinct act of grasping occurs prior to taking a position. For more critical discussion of Frege's notion of grasping see Hanks (2015) and for a recent defense of it Reiland (2019).…”

Act‐type theories of propositions

“…Schwartz and Hom (2021) raise an objection to Hanks’ version of the act‐type theory related to the content–force distinction. The content–force distinction is connected to the Frege–Geach problem (Geach, 1965; Schroeder, 2008); this is discussed in the context of the act‐type theory by Hom & Schwartz (2013) and Reiland (2012); Reiland (2019). Philosophers sympathetic to the act‐type theory have offered alternative accounts of the phenomena that Hanks’ theory of cancellation, discussed below, is supposed to explain (Bronzo, 2020; Recanati, 2019; Reiland, 2019; Schwartz & Hom, 2021).…”

“…15 15 In order to develop this theory, Hanks introduces his notion of ‘target shifting’. An alternative line of thought allows for the predication of a property to a proposition which is not performed (Reiland, 2019, secs 5–7). …”