Predictive brains and embodied, enactive cognition: an introduction to the special issue

Kirchhoff, Michael D.

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1534-5

Cited by 23 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…The majority of internal predictive model theories of consciousness subscribe to the idea that the brain is a computer-like device that 'lives in the dark' about the body and the external environment, separated from them by the skull, and that the only way it can know them is by guessing, by creating virtual representation-based models and comparing their predictions to inputs it is receiving to assess errors (Barrett, 2017;Kirchhoff, 2018). However, the brain is an integral part of the body and so, it also knows the body and the external environment in a much more direct and intimate way, as its own lived reality, in which the internal and external environment are one unified non-representational experiencing (Varela et al 1991).…”

Section: Theories and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nondual awareness: Consciousness-as-such as non-representational reflexivity

Josipovic

2019

Progress in Brain Research

137

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I introduce arguments toward a non-representational reflexivity theory of consciousness-as-such to address one of the key issues in the science of consciousness today: lack of understanding of the nature of consciousness itself. An expanded map of consciousness is outlined, which includes, in addition to the well-known contents of awareness and levels of arousal, the indeterminate substrate and consciousness-as-such or nondual awareness. The central idea presented is that consciousness-as-such is a non-conceptual nondual awareness, whose essential property is non-representational reflexivity. This property makes consciousness-as-such phenomenologically, cognitively and neurobiologically a unique kind, different from and irreducible to any contents, functions and states, including the indeterminate substrate. Our previous hypothesis on the precuneus network for nondual awareness is further discussed in relation to non-representational reflexivity, and in the light of other hypotheses on the neural correlates of consciousness-as-such.

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Section: Theories and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nondual awareness: Consciousness-as-such as non-representational reflexivity

Josipovic

2019

Progress in Brain Research

137

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“…The mind is bounded ; at one level, the “world” can only be known via its impression on the sensory epithelium and the belief updating entailed by active inference that sensations evoke. This boundary (known as a Markov blanket, see Kirchhoff, 2017; Kirchhoff et al., 2018) demarcates any system or creature from the environment in which it is immersed and also describes nested layers of top-down/bottom-up interfaces within the brain.…”

Section: Psychoanalytic Resonancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 6 This a key point of intersection between Bayesian predictive processing theories and “embodied enactive” models of the mind which prevail in cognitive science (Hohwy, 2013; Kirchhoff, 2017). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“Surprise” and the Bayesian Brain: Implications for Psychotherapy Theory and Practice

Holmes

Nolte

2019

Front. Psychol.

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The free energy principle (FEP) has gained widespread interest and growing acceptance as a new paradigm of brain function, but has had little impact on the theory and practice of psychotherapy. The aim of this paper is to redress this. Brains rely on Bayesian inference during which “bottom-up” sensations are matched with “top-down” predictions. Discrepancies result in “prediction error.” The brain abhors informational “surprise,” which is minimized by (1) action enhancing the statistical likelihood of sensory samples, (2) revising inferences in the light of experience, updating “priors” to reality-aligned “posteriors,” and (3) optimizing the complexity of our generative models of a capricious world. In all three, free energy is converted to bound energy. In psychopathology energy either remains unbound, as in trauma and inhibition of agency, or manifests restricted, anachronistic “top-down” narratives. Psychotherapy fosters client agency, linguistic and practical. Temporary uncoupling bottom-up from top-down automatism and fostering scrutinized simulations sets a number of salutary processes in train. Mentalising enriches Bayesian inference, enabling experience and feeling states to be “metabolized” and assimilated. “Free association” enhances more inclusive sensory sampling, while dream analysis foregrounds salient emotional themes as “attractors.” FEP parallels with psychoanalytic theory are outlined, including Freud’s unpublished project, Bion’s “contact barrier” concept, the Fonagy/Target model of sexuality, Laplanche’s therapist as “enigmatic signifier,” and the role of projective identification. The therapy stimulates patients to become aware of and revise the priors’ they bring to interpersonal experience. In the therapeutic “duet for one,” the energy binding skills and non-partisan stance of the analyst help sufferers face trauma without being overwhelmed by psychic entropy. Overall, the FEP provides a sound theoretical basis for psychotherapy practice, training, and research.

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“…A growing number of scientists now consider the brain as an active organ of inference (De Ridder et al, 2013;Picard and Friston, 2014;Kirchhoff, 2018). Self-awareness and self recognition are thought to be dependent also on predictive processes -or sensorimotor simulations-implemented by the brain (Hohwy, 2013;Apps and Tsakiris, 2014;Friston, 2018).…”

Section: Sensorimotor Simulations and Predictive Processesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prerequisites for an Artificial Self

et al. 2020

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Traditionally investigated in philosophy, body ownership and agency-two main components of the minimal self-have recently gained attention from other disciplines, such as brain, cognitive and behavioral sciences, and even robotics and artificial intelligence. In robotics, intuitive human interaction in natural and dynamic environments becomes more and more important, and requires skills such as self-other distinction and an understanding of agency effects. In a previous review article, we investigated studies on mechanisms for the development of motor and cognitive skills in robots (Schillaci et al., 2016). In this review article, we argue that these mechanisms also build the foundation for an understanding of an artificial self. In particular, we look at developmental processes of the minimal self in biological systems, transfer principles of those to the development of an artificial self, and suggest metrics for agency and body ownership in an artificial self.

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Predictive brains and embodied, enactive cognition: an introduction to the special issue

Cited by 23 publications

References 39 publications

Nondual awareness: Consciousness-as-such as non-representational reflexivity

Nondual awareness: Consciousness-as-such as non-representational reflexivity

“Surprise” and the Bayesian Brain: Implications for Psychotherapy Theory and Practice

Prerequisites for an Artificial Self

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