Predictive Modeling in Hostage and Barricade Incidents

Abstract

The study examined 534 hostage and barricade incidents. Its objective was to present an integrated and formalized vision of current conceptualizations of critical incidents to optimize decision making. To this end, logistic regression and recursive partitioning models are presented and compared. In all, 18 distinct static and dynamic individual and situational factors were used to predict various outputs during this type of situation. Results highlight the importance of considering the origin of the emergency call and being barricaded in one's home in the assessment of perpetrator's propensity for violence, the fact that time is not always on the police's side during critical incidents, and the relatively minor importance of hostage taking in the general comprehension of these high-risk events.S ince its very beginnings, the study of hostage and barricade incidents has itself been hostage to an intuitive and empirically fragmentary conceptual framework. This has not only limited innovative thought and the development of new ideas but also handicapped police decision making. In fact, the predictive abilities of law enforcement personnel managing critical incidents have been impaired by both the absence of a formal, integrated vision of the factors that contribute to the conceptualization of these events and the current exclusive reliance on the experience, judgement, and intuition of practitioners working in the field. This lack of decision-making guidance is particularly problematic in the dynamic context of hostage and barricade incidents, which are characterized by a high risk of violence, high-stakes outcomes, time pressure, and limited information. Consequently, there seems to be a need for empirical assistance that can support police decision makers in their efforts to peacefully resolve such complex and volatile situations. This aid can be ensured by quantitatively modeling and subsequently predicting perpetrators' behaviors during critical incidents.

Crime science and crime epidemics in developing countries: a reflection on kidnapping for ransom in Colombia, South America

“…However, the preponderance of the literature views K&R as a "rational" crime (Briggs 2001;Marongiu and Clarke 1993;Michaud et al 2008;Nax 2008;Pires et al 2014;Tzanelli 2006;Vannini et al 2012;Yang et al 2007;Yun and Roth 2008). The crime is rational because offenders make a cost-benefit calculation that the hostage will be ransomed quickly 3 (Marongiu and Clarke 1993) and apprehension is unlikely (Briggs 2001;Christi 2008).…”

Differentiating crisis incidents: A replication study using the action systems model

“…The presence of multiple, armed officers can increase the perpetrators stress levels, anxiety, and emotional response, as well as behavioural response (McMains & Mullins, ; Noesner & Dolan, ). Mental health issues, drug or alcohol abuse, suicidal ideation, law enforcement stereotypes, criminal history, and the nature of the relationship between the victim and the offender are all very powerful factors that will inevitably influence the perpetrator to act or react in a particular manner (Flood & Dalfonzo, ; Michaud et al, ; Parker & Auerhahn, ). Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) has limited time to assess the situation and the potential for future violence (Beauregard & Michaud, ).…”

“…The volatile nature of CIs “occasionally results in the death of responding officers” as well as death or injury to the offender and victim(s) (Booth et al, ; Pinizzotto, Davis, & Miller, ). CIs are characterised by a high risk of violence along with high‐stakes outcomes (Call, ; McMains & Mullins, ; Michaud, St‐Yves, & Guay, ; Romano, ).…”

The Case of Ditto Block: A Study of Special Weapons and Tactics, Antisocial Personality, Mental Illness and Barricade Offenders

“…He found there is still much work to be done before intelligence feed to SWAT units and negotiators can be employed with confidence with his final opinion being intelligence products were not at the level needed for use in the field. Michaud, St-Yves, and Guay (2008b: 1143, 1145 addressed predicting behaviors of hostage and barricade offenders during critical incidents and reported they could both (a) predict sequence of incidents and (b) predict three turning points of critical incident. Moreover, they reported they could make predictions with considerable precision.…”