Predictive processing and foundationalism about perception

Abstract

Predictive processing accounts of perception (PP) assume that perception does not work in a purely bottom-up fashion but also uses acquired knowledge to make top-down predictions about the incoming sensory signals. This provides a challenge for foundationalist accounts of perception according to which perceptual beliefs are epistemically basic, that is, epistemically independent from other beliefs. If prior beliefs rationally influence which perceptual beliefs we come to accept, then foundationalism about perception appears untenable. I review several ways in which foundationalism might be reconciled with PP from both an internalist and externalist perspective, and argue that an externalist foundationalism provides the best match with PP.

Perceptual justification in the Bayesian brain: a foundherentist account

“…Despite those facts, I take perceptual inferences in PP to be truth-preserving transitions between representational states (see also Kiefer, 2017). These inferences can endow perceptual states with epistemic justification because they are similar enough to other unconscious, non-voluntary inferences that we take for granted as underlying justification transfer (Ghijsen, 2018;Siegel, 2017; see also Carter et al 2020). 6 Second, perceptual states' epistemic standing originates from their inferential relations to antecedent states instead of being merely modulated by them.…”

“…I propose that the notion that perception is inferential in this way-that it relies on antecedent mental states to produce a perceptual state, in a way that accords to a normative rule of inference-is epistemologically relevant (see also Clark, 2018;Ghijsen, 2018;Munton, 2018;Vance, 2015). My overall point can be captured in four interrelated claims.…”

“…Relatedly, if perception solves the underdetermination problem mentioned earlier, then, on the PP view, the problem is solved through inference. Because of how pervasive the role of inference in perception is, according to PP, it is reasonable to see it as a source of epistemic justification rather than a modifier of non-inferential justification (see also Ghijsen, 2018;Jenkin, 2020;Vance, 2015).…”

Un-debunking Ordinary Objects with the Help of Predictive Processing

“…What I have said so far is purposefully noncommittal with respect to the exact architecture of perceptual justification that falls out of PP (for some proposals, see Ghijsen [2018]; Gładziejewski [2017]; Munton [2018]). For present purposes, it suffices to establish that perceptual representations of objects are rationally produced.…”

Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?

“…99In fact, if theories of predictive processing are on the right track, then all sorts of expectations besides appearances from several modalities might influence one's categorization of objects (Clark, 2016; Ghijsen, 2018; Hohwy, 2013). Think about recognizing oranges in the supermarket: why are you justified in believing that those are oranges rather than, say, large tangerines?…”